Governors Matter:A Comparative Study of State-Business Relations in Russia’s Regions by Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz & Steinbuks, Jevgenijs
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1111/ecot.12124
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Sharafutdinova, G., & Steinbuks, J. (2017). Governors Matter: A Comparative Study of State-Business Relations
in Russia’s Regions. ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecot.12124
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. Jul. 2020
 1 
Governors Matter: A Comparative Study of State-Business Relations in Russia’s 
Regions1 
 
1. Introduction 
  
Governance institutions matter for development. Scholars have linked better governance to 
economic growth (Kaufmann et al. 1999, 2002; Kaufmann and Kraay 2002), foreign direct 
investment (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002), higher firms’ productivity and growth (Batra 
et al. 2003; Dollar et al. 2005), entrepreneurship (Hart 2003), and regional development 
(Rodríguez-Pose 2013). Most researchers agree that ‘good’ governance institutions would 
have to provide for quality of public service provision, security of property rights, control 
of corruption, and macroeconomic stability contributing to the business environment that 
reduces uncertainty and promotes productive investment activities. It is also increasingly 
clear that the particular institutional arrangements that work in one context do not in 
others (Jütting 2003).  Hence, specific governance institutions that could serve the 
aforementioned purposes could be different (Dixit 2004; Rodrik 2008). Moreover, 
alternative governance models exist not only at the state level. A significant heterogeneity 
in governance institutions that shape state-business relations has been found at the 
subnational level as well (Yakovlev 2006; Pyle 2009; Cali and Sen 2011). Motivated by this 
literature, this study seeks to identify the important subnational institutional arrangements 
that shape specific contexts (in our case it is a context of the Russian Federation) and make 
for (or inhibit) a favorable business environment that can promote investment, growth, 
and increase welfare.  
 
Massive data-collecting projects such as the Doing Business project and Enterprise 
Surveys2 have been sponsored by the World Bank to assess business conditions around the 
world and identify factors that shape business environment and firms’ economic behavior. 
These projects, motivated by the assumption that regulatory environment is linked to 
                                                        
1 The authors would like to thank Gregory Kisunko, Birgit Hansl, Steve Knack, Timothy Frye, Quintin Beazer 
and the participants of the PONARS political economy workshop for their helpful comments on the earlier 
drafts. The financial support of the World Bank is greatly acknowledged.  The opinions expressed in this 
paper are of authors’ alone and do not reflect the views of the World Bank, its Board of Directors and the 
Member states.    
2 http://www.doingbusiness.org; http://www.enterprisesurveys.org;  
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economic outcomes, provide an empirical basis for testing relationships between 
regulation and development, allow for country benchmarking and comparison, and inform 
policymakers about relationships between specific regulations and economic variables 
(Davis and Kruse 2007, p. 1098). Making use of such initiatives, this study relies on the 
latest 2011 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) for the 
Russian Federation to explore state-business environment and factors in the institutional 
environment associated with firms’ ‘(un)happiness’ levels across the country. Building on 
the key insight regarding the importance of regulatory and other types of uncertainty for 
the business environment and firm behavior (Dixit and Pindyck 1994), we test hypotheses 
focusing on the role of regional executive authorities in Russia.  Our analysis suggests that 
regional executives represented by Russia’s regional governors are of paramount 
importance for firms' perceptions of the regional business environment and the obstacles 
they face in their operation.  Russian firms reveal a strong preference for administrative 
continuity in the regions and their insecurities and complaints increase significantly during 
political transitions associated with gubernatorial change.  Additionally, firms seem more 
content in regions with local governors – those whose careers developed within the region 
as opposed to those who assumed the positions as outsiders - reflecting, arguably, the 
importance of pre-existing ties and relationships between political and economic elites in 
the regions. The study provides a systematic illustration of the degree to which economic 
actors in Russia find themselves vulnerable and dependent on regional administrative 
structures and of the shifting nature of firms' perceptions and experiences of the regional 
business environment as the region-wide economic-political ties stabilize and fears related 
to political change subside. 
 
The remainder of the paper consists of six sections including the discussion of the interplay 
between Russian businesses and regional political elites, followed by the empirical 
specification, data, results, sensitivity analysis and the combined discussion and 
conclusions.  
 
2. Russian Governors and Regional Businesses – What is at Stake? 
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The business environment and state-business interaction in Russia’s regions vary 
considerably (CEFIR 2006; Yakovlev 2006; Plekhanov and Isakova 2011). The 2011 BEEPS 
survey highlights the regional diversity in business climate:  regional location is 
significantly correlated with firms’ perceptions of administrative burden, corruption, and 
state capture (Kisunko and Knack 2013). The extensive literature on state-business 
relations in Russia does include studies that have approached the subject from a regional 
perspective. Much attention in this regionally grounded research is paid to institutional 
factors, including the role of political institutions in regional economic growth (Libman 
2010), firms’ entry and exit (Bruno et al. 2013), and firm behavior with regard to limiting 
government predation (Pyle 2009).   A number of scholars focus on the role of business 
associations in providing firms with lobbying services and collective action opportunities 
that became especially important in the new environment of a more consolidated 
bureaucratic state machine in the 2000s (Frye 2002; Yakovlev 2006; Markus 2007; Pyle 
2009; Duvanova 2011). Both formal and informal institutions on the regional level appear 
important (Frye et al., 2009; Adachi 2011; Bruno et al. 2013; Rochlitz 2014). The special 
relations between firms and regional governments are found to be consequential for firm-
level decision-making and the regional-level business environment (Frye 2002; Slinko, et 
al. 2005; Yakovlev, 2006, 2011).  
 
While it has been shown that firms’ geographical location matters and that regional 
variation in institutional characteristics might potentially be an important factor for 
explaining differences in firms’ entry, growth and productivity and, consequently, regional 
economic development and prosperity, the questions of why regions matter and which 
regional institutions make a difference for firms’ behavior have not been yet answered 
convincingly.  Plekhanov and Isakova (2011) use 2008-09 BEEPS data to study regional 
differences in the business environment in Russia but data constraints limit their analysis 
of the institutional determinants of regional variation in the business environment.  
Kisunko and Knack (2013) conduct an exploratory analysis using the more recent BEEPS 
data and point out the potential importance of regional level policy and institutional 
differences. Their focus, however, is on regional and national trends in the business 
environment rather than on factors associated with regional differentiation. Given the 
availability of the 2011 BEEPS data that is regionally representative, the exploration of 
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principal regional-level institutions that shape business environment appears both timely 
and significant.  
 
A good place to start the analysis is to observe that the defining and well-documented 
feature of Russian regional economic activities is a very strong mutual dependence 
between economic and political actors (Stoner-Weiss 2002; Frye 2002; Slinko et al. 2005; 
Yakovlev 2006; Sharafutdinova 2010). The balance of power between the business and the 
state has shifted, in the last decade and a half, in favor of the state revealing the 
effectiveness of president Vladimir Putin’s policies aimed at strengthening the executive 
vertical of power (Gans-Morse 2012, Rochlitz 2014, Yakovlev, et al., 2014). This points to 
the importance of the institution of the governor and his team in establishing a specific 
mode of relationship with regional businesses, mechanisms of exchange and other rules of 
state-business interaction that contribute to a predictable business environment in the 
region. 
 
Governors – or regional chief executives – represent the ultimate authority in their regions, 
and usually, play a role of ultimate arbiters in the region’s politics and economics but they 
never govern alone and have to develop and rely on their teams to get things done.  This 
regional chief along with his or her team (frequently referred to by Russian experts as 
regional’naya vlast’ or administratsiya) is arguably the key regional actor with the potential 
to make a difference both in the overall regional business climate and in the prospects of a 
specific firm. One of the key factors associated with the regional administration is the 
degree of its continuity reflected in the length of gubernatorial stay in office.  The core 
gubernatorial team rarely changes under the same regional chief; every new regional 
governor, on the other hand, tends to bring with him/herself a number of new people that 
are placed in key administrative positions (Podvintsev 2009).3  Given the centrality of 
regional executive power for the regional business environment – in terms of regulation, 
rules implementation, protection of property rights, providing access to government 
contracts, access to land and other important underpinnings of business success, it seems 
plausible to suggest that a lengthier stay in office for a given governor and his/her team can 
                                                        
3 Even when a new governor is selected from the outgoing governor’s team, the administrative team changes, 
albeit in a more gradual fashion (Podvintsev 2009). 
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be a crucial precondition for greater stability and predictability of the underlying business 
environment in the region.  
 
Taking the firms’ perspective, the key insight from the economic literature is that firms do 
not like uncertainty, which presents a fundamental challenge to their decision-making, 
influencing their investment strategies, restructuring, hiring and other choices that shape 
their economic activity (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, Bloom 2009). Uncertainty is 
multidimensional and can emanate from different sources such as issues related to demand 
and supply, regulation and legal environment, monetary and financial systems, political 
stability, technological shocks and various other factors (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, chapter 
1). It has been shown theoretically and empirically that firms value political stability and 
predictability of rules as reflected in higher rates of investment and economic growth 
(Brunetti et al., 1998; Asiedu 2006; Malesky and Samphantharak 2008). This factor is also 
treated as an essential feature of good governance (Kaufman et al., 1999, 2002). In Russia, 
there is potentially a higher chance that the longer serving governors with their longer 
serving teams had been able to establish a system of rules and agreements amounting to a 
working administrative system that can provide businesses with a more predictable 
operating environment and greater policy stability.  
 
However, it is also plausible to suggest that gubernatorial tenure and, possibly, a greater 
informal institutionalization linked to a governor’s lengthier stay in power might be 
associated with more bribes and greater corruption as well as a higher degree of ‘state 
capture,’ normally considered a negative factor for the business environment. This has 
been discussed in many country contexts, including that of Russia, using the ‘grabbing 
hand’ model of the government (Frye and Shleifer 1997; Shleifer and Vishny 2002; Dalgic 
and Van Long 2006). Therefore, the effect of administrative continuity associated with 
gubernatorial tenure in office on business climate – actual and perceived – is a matter for 
empirical testing in this study. 
 
Based on the above discussion, the first hypothesis in this study is that regional business 
environment is shaped by administrative continuity determined by gubernatorial tenure.  
Specifically, our first conjecture is that administrative continuity is associated with the more 
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predictable regional business environment and more content economic actors. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the adverse effects of increasing corruption associated with 
administrative continuity are likely to increase business actors’ discontent.     
 
There is another factor associated with the figure of the regional governor that might be 
important for business environment from the perspective of predictability and lower 
degree of uncertainty – a governor’s local roots, that is, the degree to which she or he is a 
regional insider, a local politician who made his or her career within the region; or an 
outsider brought into the region by the Kremlin.  Governors with preexisting ties to and in 
the region would have had a greater opportunity to be part of and forge further mutually-
beneficial inter-elite exchange relationships that have been found important for the 
regional business environment (Podvintsev 2009, Yakovlev 2011), while the outsiders can 
develop such relations only provided time and political skills. This factor was made 
relevant in 2005, when the gubernatorial selection mechanism changed from election-
based to appointment-based and the Kremlin, faced with problems of availability of 
acceptable local cadre or other political issues, made decisions to appoint ‘varyags’ – the 
commonly used nickname for the governors whose roots lie outside the region, or 
“governors-outsiders”.  This factor can arguably be also related to stability and 
predictability of the regional business environment. The appointment of an outsider to a 
top administrative position in the region might result in a ‘disequilibration,' an 
unsettlement of regional-level informal networks and arrangements.  Governors-outsiders 
lack social and political capital in the region, are not familiar with local ‘heavyweights’ and 
brokers, lack local knowledge that might be helpful in inter-elite interaction, and therefore 
are at a disadvantage when compared to regional insiders. Governors-outsiders also tend 
to bring in other outsiders into the region to join their administrative team. The key 
members of their teams are usually individuals that come along with them, thus causing 
greater anxiety and uncertainty among the local elites. Russian regional analysts have 
developed a widely shared consensus that governors-varyags were frequently ineffective 
because they lacked the necessary knowledge, connections and support base in the region.4  
There are very few exceptions to this rule.  Of course, after a while, outsiders might become 
                                                        
4 For an illuminating case study of Samara oblast, see Chirikova (2011). Also, see Podvintsev (2009).  
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insiders, and, given time, political skill, and favorable conditions, governors who initially 
lacked local knowledge and local social and political capital might gain these resources.  
Therefore, it appears plausible to suggest that if outsider-governors persevere through the 
initial difficulties and forge working relationships with regional elites, the disadvantages 
they faced initially will dissipate with time.  Hence, the outsider status is likely to be 
especially disruptive for the regional business environment in the early stages of the 
outsider-governors' careers in the region.      
 
The second hypothesis, therefore, is that in regions with local governors firms are more 
satisfied with the regional business environment than in regions with governors-outsiders. 
The difference in (dis)satisfaction levels, however, diminishes with outsider-governors' tenure. 
 
3. Empirical Specification  
The empirical specification adopted in this study is based on the econometric model with 
latent variables, which takes a general form of 
 
𝑦∗ = 𝑥′𝛽 + 𝑧′𝛾 + 𝜖,  (1)  
 
where  y* is the exact but unobserved dependent variable (in BEEPS case for example, 
respondents’ exact level of dissatisfaction with various obstacles related to business 
environment); 
x is the vector of variables related to administrative continuity and regional authorities’ 
local roots,  𝑧 is the vector of other control variables that explain the business environment 
and the quality of state-business relations in Russian regions, and  and 𝛾 are the vectors of 
regression coefficients, which we wish to estimate.  
 
The base model specification includes a variable for measuring governor’s origin, a firm-
specific measure of governor tenure and the following control variables: firm age, size, 
sector, ownership, gross regional product (GRP) composition (construction, retail, and 
extractive sectors as a percentage of GRP); log of regional GRP; population density; and 
regional shares of state-owned and privately owned enterprises.  These controls are 
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selected based on earlier studies that have demonstrated these factors to be associated 
with firms’ perceptions of business environment (Dollar et al. 2005; Ayyagari et al. 2008; 
Eifert et al. 2008). In addition, as the experiences of local business environment for firms 
that have experienced the change of regional administration are likely different from those 
who did not, we include a treatment binary variable for whether the firm has experienced a 
change in regional governor.  
 
To estimate the econometric model characterized by equation (1) we employ three 
different methods for analyzing limited dependent variable (DV) data. The continuous 
limited DVs, such as, for example, the number of days necessary to obtain an operating 
license or the size of informal payments as the percentage of annual sales are estimated 
using the Heckman selection model that allows for correcting the sample selection bias 
introduced by responses such as ‘don’t know’ or ‘refuse to answer’.  The default estimation 
method is maximum likelihood. If the model does not converge, the original two-step 
method is applied (Statacorp 2015b, p. 400). An instrumental variable used in the first 
stage is the quality of firms' bookkeeping records (as reported by the interviewers). It is 
negatively correlated with ‘don’t know’ answers and assumed not correlated with the 
unobserved endogenous latent variable (for example, the respondents’ sensitivity to 
questions due to their political connections).5  To avoid model misspecification, in the first 
stage we also include a number of control variables that can affect the robustness of our 
chosen instrument, such as, for example, presence of females in firm’s ownership and top 
management, years of experience of firms’ top manager, and the presence of internationally 
recognized quality certification. The binary limited DVs such as ‘did you apply for a 
government contract’ (yes/no answers) are estimated by the logit model. The ranked 
limited DVs are estimated using an ordered logit model that allow for analyzing non-
uniform intervals in observed outcomes. For all three methods, robust standard errors 
allowing for clustered correlations by region, industry, and size are estimated. All three 
methods are estimated using STATA 14 statistical software (StataCorp, 2015a).  
                                                        
5 We make this assumption because there is no reason to believe that the presence of political connections, 
which presumably underlies respondents’ sensitivity to answering certain questions, should be linked to the 
quality of bookkeeping, which is rather determined by the quality of accountant and the properties of the 
sector a firm operates in.  Conceptually, the reliance on political connections – at the firm owner level – is not 
likely to be directly linked to operational level accounting in any systematic manner.   
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As regards identification issues, a potentially confounding problem is that we assume 
exogeneity of gubernatorial tenure and origin with respect to unobserved factors 
associated with the regional business environment. This assumption is largely supported 
by the studies of gubernatorial appointment patterns in Russia that point out the 
importance of political loyalty indicators measured through electoral performance of 
United Russia, a party of power, and unrelated to economic competence and economic 
performance indicators (Reuter and Robertson 2012). Given further empirical explorations 
into vote mobilization techniques in Russia, we suggest, with a reasonable degree of 
confidence, that regional business environment and institutional quality are not associated 
with vote mobilization and therefore cannot be expected to influence gubernatorial tenure 
(Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi 2014). Additionally, empirical evidence shows that regional 
businesses’ mobilization capacity is heavily circumscribed by the state authorities 
(Yakovlev et al. 2014), which makes the potential reverse causality associated with 
business actors reacting to sub-par business climate and affecting administrative 
continuity unlikely.  
 
4. Data  
The analysis of the business environment and the quality of state-business relations in 
Russian regions in this study relies on the conceptualization of state-business relations 
used in the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 
implemented by the World Bank and the EBRD.  The latest 2011 round of BEEPS for the 
Russian Federation was for the first time designed to be representative of Russian regions 
and provides the most systematic instrument available today for measuring regional 
variation in state-business relations in Russia in the last few years. A total of 4220 firms 
were surveyed across 37 regions with approximately 120 firms per region. The survey 
allows for treating Russian regions6 as a natural laboratory for studying state-business 
relations, which is beneficial both analytically and policy-wise.  Analytically, it allows us to 
avoid country-specific heterogeneities (such as historical legacies, national institutions, and 
                                                        
6 In the period studied the Russian Federation was divided into 83 federal subjects (constituent units) 
including 21 republics, 9 krais, 46 oblasts, 2 federal cities, 1 autonomous oblast and 4 autonomous okrugs. 
For the purposes of this paper, all these federal subjects are called “regions”. 
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policies), common in cross-country research. The recent proliferation of subnational level 
research in political science and economics is one of the indications of these advantages 
(Tsai and Ziblatt 2010). From a policy-making perspective, it is important to investigate 
regional-level variation because regional governments and institutions influence the 
business climate and regional development in Russia (Rodríguez-Pose 2013).  
 
The survey combines perception and experience-based questions designed to explore 
patterns of interaction between firms and state actors across a variety of spheres.  
Respondents – senior managers – were asked, among other things, to assess the 
importance to their firms’ operation of sixteen governance and administrative obstacles 
such as corruption, access to land and finance, labor regulations, and informal competition. 
The survey questions were conceptualized to also serve as measures of administrative 
corruption and state capture across Russian regions.7  
 
The explanatory variables of main interest, as discussed above, comprise two indicators 
associated with regional executive chiefs. Administrative continuity is constructed by 
calculating the number of months a governor was in office at the time each firm was 
interviewed.8 In regression specifications described below this variable was expressed as a 
logarithm to allow for elasticity interpretation. A Regional Authorities’ Local Roots dummy 
variable assigns 1 to regions run by governors who are regional insiders and 0 to outsiders. 
The coding of this variable was based on the analysis of regional governors’ biographies 
and involved a determination of whether the individual in question has had his career 
progress in the region.  The insider-governors had either had all of their careers made in 
the region or spent more than three years occupying top positions in the regional 
government or leading regional enterprises in the regions where they’ve become 
governors.9 To preserve space we report the summary descriptive statistics only for these 
                                                        
7 For a summary descriptive statistics of these variables see Tables A4.1 - A4.7 in the online appendix. 
8 We used months instead of years to obtain a more accurate and continuous measure of tenure. 
9 For example, even if a governor was not originally from a particular region but occupied such official 
positions as the post of a deputy governor, or worked as a manager/director of a large regional enterprise, 
then he was treated for the purposes of this study as an insider because he had time to build that local 
knowledge and social capital.  On the other hand, if a newly appointed governor was born and studied in a 
particular region but built the main stages of his career elsewhere, for the purposes of this study he is treated 
as an outsider because such individual can not be expected to be embedded in local elite networks.    
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two key variables (see Tables A1 and A2 in the online appendix). Further information 
describing other firm-level variables used to construct the data is available in Kisunko and 
Knack (2013). The data for other, non firm-level, control variables came from the Federal 
State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation (2015). 
 
Limitations of the data used in this study are mostly related to data characteristics and 
operationalization issues.  Perhaps the most important data limitation is the selection bias 
engrained in the survey.  According to the EBRD (2012), only 22 percent of contacted firms 
were surveyed. About half (56 percent) of the contacted firms refused to participate, and 
some firms were found ineligible to take the survey because of the sampling requirements. 
An additional concern is that the survey can only be conducted with those firms that have 
survived in Russia’s challenging institutional environment. This means that the 
composition of firms surveyed across different rounds of BEEPS, including the last 2011 
round, is likely to be qualitatively different. In short, there is a ‘success’ bias in the data and 
BEEPS does not provide any information on firms that have exited the regional economy or 
have gone informal. Moreover, given the complexities of doing business in Russia, no 
survey, even as comprehensive as BEEPS, can capture all factors that could be perceived as 
obstacles as well as factors that may be necessary for success when doing business in 
various Russian regions; a number of the BEEPS questions might have been perceived as 
too sensitive by top managers, presumably concerned with potential political fallout; 
therefore, there are grounds to question the accuracy of specific responses.10   
 
5. Results 
Tables 1-3 present estimation results of the empirical specification (1) for different 
measures of firms' experiences of the business environment. The results in the Tables 1-3 
are organized in accordance with three broad aspects of the regional business 
environment: regulatory and legal institutions, structural characteristics and external 
obstacles, and administrative corruption and state capture. To preserve space, we report 
estimated coefficients for two key variables of interest (governor’s tenure and insider 
origin), with full estimation results reported in the online appendix.  
                                                        
10 This might be especially true for questions about the share and particular amounts of informal payments 
and gifts given to get things done.   
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Administrative continuity plays a significant role in shaping firms’ perceptions of the 
business environment in Russia. The results of the econometric analysis demonstrate 
rather convincingly that longer governor tenure is associated with the amelioration of 
firms’ perceptions of most regulatory obstacles to business operation measured by BEEPS.  
Specifically, on customs and trade regulations, tax administration, business licensing and 
permits, courts, and labor regulations, firms in regions with longer serving governors 
express less concern than in regions where governors have shorter tenure (Table 1).  
Longer governor tenure is also associated with lower regulatory burden. A 100 percent 
increase in governor tenure (that is, if tenure doubles) corresponds to an 8.3 percent 
decline in managers' time spent on regulations, and a 6.8 percent declines in the number of 
tax inspections and a number of days required to get an operating license (Table 1).    
 
Table 1: Impact of Regional Political Factors on Firms’ Experience and Perceptions of 
Regulatory and Legal Authorities 
 
 Model Tenure Insider Origin 
  coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. 
The extent to which these issue areas are perceived as an 
obstacle to firms' operation: 
  
Tax administration Ologit -0.17*** 0.061 -0.302*** 0.104 
Courts Ologit -0.15* 0.08 -0.405*** 0.132 
Business licensing and permits Ologit -0.322*** 0.067 -0.323*** 0.107 
Customs and trade regulations Ologit -0.315*** 0.081 -0.141 0.123 
Labor regulations Ologit -0.302*** 0.074 -0.265** 0.116 
Regulatory burden:      
Manager time spent on regulations Heckit -0.083*** 0.011 -0.075*** 0.016 
Number of tax inspections last year Heckit -0.068*** 0.018 -0.041 0.031 
Number of days to get operating license Heckit -0.068*** 0.028 -0.098*** 0.045 
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ologit: ordered logit model. Heckit: Heckman selection model. Estimated 
coefficients for Heckit and Logit models are converted to marginal effects. Estimated coefficients for Ologit models 
are shown as is. Firm-level control variables (reported in the online appendix) include firms’ size, age, sector, 
exporter status, foreign and state ownership, and experience of governor's change. Regional control variables 
(reported in the online appendix) include natural logarithm of gross regional product (GRP) in 2010, shares of 
construction, retail, and natural resources in GRP, the share of Russian speakers, and population density. 
 
As regards such external obstacles as access to land, lack of skilled and educated workers, 
and crime/theft/disorder in the region, we observe the same relationship with firms 
complaining less about these factors in regions with longer serving governors (Table 2). 
Only for one obstacle – tax rates – the analysis shows a statistically significant positive 
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impact of long tenure.  This exception appears to be an exception that proves the rule.  Tax 
rates are the most generic concern for all the businesses around the world and they can 
arguably dominate in the situations when other concerns – especially those related to state 
officials - are relatively insignificant. 
 
 
Table 2. Impact of Regional Political Factors on Firms’ Perceptions of Regional 
Structural Characteristics and External Obstacles   
 
The extent to which these issue areas are perceived 
as obstacle to firms’ operation 
Model Tenure Insider Origin 
  coeff s.e. coeff s.e. 
Access to land Ologit -0.178** 0.07 -0.4*** 0.1 
Access to finance Ologit -0.11* 0.057 -0.206** 0.086 
Crime/theft/disorder Ologit -0.3*** 0.064 -0.479*** 0.107 
Informal competition  Ologit -0.023 0.067 -0.406*** 0.102 
Tax rates Ologit 0.11** 0.05 0.038 0.08 
Uneducated workforce Ologit -0.159*** 0.059 -0.354*** 0.099 
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ologit: ordered logit model. Heckit: Heckman selection model. Estimated 
coefficients for Heckit and Logit models are converted to marginal effects. Estimated coefficients for Ologit models 
are shown as is. Firm-level control variables (reported in the online appendix) include firms' size, age, sector, 
exporter status, foreign and state ownership, and experience of governor's change. Regional control variables 
(reported in the online appendix) include natural logarithm of gross regional product (GRP) in 2010, shares of 
construction, retail, and natural resources in GRP, share of Russian speakers, and population density.   
 
The results are not as clear when it comes to the issue of corruption. Longer governor 
tenure is associated with more informal payments expected at tax meetings and needed to 
obtain construction permit and operating license although none of these effects is 
statistically significant (Table 3).  At the same time, longer governor tenure yields lower 
percentage of annual sales paid in informal payments (Table 3).  This effect is not only 
statistically significant but is also quite substantial in size. Thus, a doubling in governor 
tenure produces around .058 percentage points decline in the reported share of sales paid 
in informal payments to various authorities to ‘get things done'.11 In regions with longer 
gubernatorial tenure firms also report less need for them when dealing with customs and 
imports, courts, and tax collection (Table 3).  And longer tenure is associated with lesser 
propensity for firms to complain on a more generic question about informal payments 
needed ‘to get things done with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, etc.’  
                                                        
11 Given the average of 1.06 percent of annual sales paid as informal payments on average for 4220 firms,  
-.058 appears as an effect worthy of consideration. 
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There are some additional indicators that the amount of corruption might be growing with 
administrative continuity. BEEPS obtained firms’ responses to a series of vignettes 
describing a corruption situation in an imaginary town/village with one town featuring a 
no bribes case and four other towns featuring different combinations of corruption-
efficiency scale.  On all but the ‘free-of-bribery’ case, longer governor tenure is associated 
with firms’ greater perceptions of corruption as an obstacle (see Tables A5.28-A5.32 in the 
appendix). When asked more directly about corruption as an obstacle, firms once again 
give somewhat different responses. While tenure does not seem to have statistically 
significant effect on firms’ opinions about corruption as an obstacle to their operations, 
firms in regions with longer serving governors tend to choose corruption as their ‘number 
one obstacle’ less often (see Table 3). It might be that corruption growth in regions with 
longer serving governors does not turn into a source of intense complaints for firms 
operating in these regions. That firms in such regions tend to report less state capture also 
supports this interpretation.  A sensitivity analysis presented below will reveal that some 
of these findings are driven by relationships in more particular firm cohorts.  
 
Table 3. Impact of Regional Political Factors on Firms’ Experience with and 
Perceptions of Administrative Corruption and State Capture 
 
 Model Tenure Insider Origin 
  coeff s.e. coeff s.e. 
Informal payments    
When dealing with customs/imports Ologit -0.297*** 0.085 -0.737*** 0.131 
When dealing with courts Ologit -0.313*** 0.077 -0.939*** 0.122 
When dealing with taxes/tax collection Ologit -0.152** 0.069 -0.931*** 0.113 
When getting a construction permit Logit 0.021 0.033 -0.065 0.06 
When getting an operating license Logit 0.021 0.016 -0.044 0.027 
Expected at tax meetings Logit 0.048 0.007 -0.027** 0.012 
% of annual sales paid in informal payments Heckit -0.058** 0.028 -0.074 0.05 
'it is common to pay informal payments to get things 
done with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, 
regulations, etc.’ 
Ologit 
-0.206*** 0.057 -0.942*** 0.094 
State capture   
Private payments to parliamentarians have an impact Ologit -0.193** 0.093 -1.049*** 0.148 
Private payments to government officials have an 
impact 
Ologit 
-0.245** 0.088 -0.984*** 0.142 
Private payments to regional officials have an impact Ologit -0.237*** 0.075 -0.857*** 0.13 
Corruption    
As an obstacle Ologit -0.08 0.057 -0.205** 0.090 
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As number 1 obstacle Logit -0.013** 0.006 -0.02* 0.011 
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ologit: ordered logit model. Heckit: Heckman selection model. Estimated 
coefficients for Heckit and Logit models are converted to marginal effects. Estimated coefficients for Ologit models 
are shown as is. Firm-level control variables (reported in online appendix) include firms’ size, age, sector, exporter 
status, foreign and state ownership, and experience of governor’s change. Regional control variables (reported in 
online appendix) include natural logarithm of gross regional product (GRP) in 2010, shares of construction, retail, 
and natural resources in GRP, share of Russian speakers, and population density.  
 
The governor origin variable highlighted the numerous benefits associated with governors-
insiders, as perceived by firms. Almost all regulatory obstacles and, specifically, tax 
administration, business licensing, labor regulations and courts are seen as less of an 
obstacle in regions with insider-governors than in regions with governors-outsiders (Table 
1). The same relationship holds on most other potential obstacles such as access to land, 
access to finance, informal competition, crime/theft/disorder, and inadequately educated 
workforce (Table 2). Most measures of administrative corruption produce analogous 
findings. State capture is perceived to be less of an issue in regions with governors-insiders 
as firms report less impact from private payments to parliamentarians and regional 
officials in these regions (Table 3). Also, firms in regions with insider governors tend to 
admit less to the necessity of informal payments ‘to get things done’ in general and in 
dealing with customs, courts and the tax authorities, in particular (Table 3). They report 
fewer bribes needed to be paid at tax meetings (by 2.7 percent), for getting an operating 
license (by 4.4 percent) and construction permits (by 6.5 percent), although the latter two 
effects are not statistically significant (Table 3). The actual weight of informal payments as 
a percentage of annual sales is also lower in regions with insider governors (by .74 
percentage points given the average of 1.06 percent), although it is not statistically 
significant (Table 3). In short, with regard to governor origin, the results consistently 
privilege insider governors as reflected in firms' more favorable perceptions of the various 
aspects of regional business environment. 
 
6. Sensitivity Analysis  
To account for possibly non-linear effects of administrative continuity (that is, 
relationships that are sometimes driven by the regions with very short- or very long-
serving governors), we conduct additional robustness checks.  The first one involves 
adding four tenure dummy variables based on quartile distributions (see summary 
statistics in Table A3 in the online appendix). In addition, we use a quadratic function to 
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test for potentially ‘U’ shaped relationships. The results for both of these checks are 
reported in the online appendix; they confirm that controlling for other factors, the impact 
of administrative continuity is not always linear and the relationships are sometimes 
driven by the regions with very short- or very long-serving governors, and sometimes even 
change twice going from short tenure, to medium and then to long tenure. Below we 
discuss the results based on specification with dummy variables that consistently produced 
better goodness of fit as compared to quadratic function. 
 
The sensitivity analysis produces interesting findings confirming more casual expert 
observations regarding how businesses operate in Russia. Perhaps the most important and 
most consistent finding is in relation to firms’ complaints in regions with recently 
appointed governors.  Such firms report a significantly higher (0.14 percentage points) 
actual bribes paid as a percentage of total sales (Table A5.1 in the online appendix). 
Similarly, their expectations of frequent bribes to get things done in various spheres are 
significantly higher (Tables A5.19-A5.22 in the online appendix). They also complain most 
intensely about state capture and the impact from informal payments to government 
officials, parliamentarians, and local and regional officials (Tables A5.23-5.25 in the online 
appendix). They experience a significantly higher incidence of tax inspections (Table A5.3 
in the online appendix) and are most discontent on various other issues including access to 
finance, tax administration, labor regulations, business licensing and permits, customs and 
trade regulations, crime/theft/disorder, and uneducated workforce (Tables A5.9, A5.11, 
A5.13, A5.15-A5.16, A5.26-A5.27 in the online appendix). A very high consistency of 
findings associated with the ‘negativity’ of firms of the first quartile is hardly accidental. It 
results, arguably, from at least two distinct sources. First, the findings related to bribes 
might be a reflection of a more fragmented nature of corruption in a region undergoing 
political transition and the need for more, smaller bribes expected by various agencies not 
yet incorporated into a region-wide pyramid of power.12 The findings on other indicators, 
on the other hand, might reflect an acute sense of insecurity and vulnerability that firms 
face in the period of political and regulatory transition. High levels of uncertainty under a 
changing regional administration could translate into a greater discontent on the part of 
                                                        
12 On fragmented versus centralized corruption, see Shleifer and Vishny (1993). 
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regional businesses, which frequently rely on informal links to get things done. Building 
such links and relationships takes time, effort and resources. The appointment of a new 
governor means that firms’ previous efforts to build good relationships with the regional 
administration might have been wasted and they need to start from square one, meanwhile 
facing the uncertainty about their future.      
 
The second important observation from the sensitivity analysis concerns the relatively 
outsized level of content on some issues expressed by firms in the regions with the longest 
serving governors. Thus, on the issue of access to land and informal competition as an 
obstacle firms in regions with the longest serving governors appear much more content 
compared to other firms (Tables A5.10 and A5.12 in the online appendix). It is not 
surprising and arguably reflects the selection process through which these firms have 
undergone already; their survival indicates the strength of their informal connections to 
the gubernatorial team in the first place.  
 
There is some indication that the amount of corruption might grow with gubernatorial 
tenure, as discussed earlier. Thus, in regions with more recently-appointed governors there 
is a lower probability (7.3 percent) for firms to expect informal payments to get operating 
license (Table A6.2 in the online appendix), while the probability of informal payments 
expected to get construction permit is significantly higher (24.4 percent) for firms in 
regions with longer serving governors (specifically in the 3rd quartile, see Table A6.2 in the 
online appendix). Additionally, firms in regions with recently appointed governors are less 
likely to view corruption as an obstacle to their operations when they perceive regional 
administration as corrupt and bribes do increase the chances of getting things done (Tables 
A5.31-A5.32 in the online appendix). 
  
With regard to governor’s origin, as discussed earlier, there are grounds to suspect that its 
impact might be mitigated by the time a governor-outsider spends in office. It seems 
plausible to expect, for example, that given time and skills, some outsiders might be able to 
develop effective coalitions with business actors in their regions making them more 
comparable with insiders (that is, the insider-outsider gap might lessen with tenure).  
Hence, the difference between insider and outsider governors might lessen with time. To 
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test for that hypothesis we add the multiplicative interaction term between variables of 
governor origin and governor tenure.13  
 
This indicator testing for the effect of origin with changing tenure produced interesting 
results adding further nuance to our understanding of how things work in Russia’s regions.  
Specifically, on issues of tax administration, crime/theft/disorder, business licensing and 
courts as obstacles, as well as state capture and frequency of bribes to courts and tax 
collections, our hypothesis about tenure working in favor of outsider governors is upheld 
(Tables A5.13, A5.15-A5.16, A5.18, A5.21-A5.22, A5.23-A5.25 in the online appendix). The 
model reveals advantages associated with insider-governors at short tenure but, at long 
tenure, firms’ perceptions of these issues are either more favorable or display more 
positive trends in regions with outsider governors. This confirms our intuition that with 
time outsider governors can, so to say, prove themselves and even outperform insiders on 
selected indicators of business climate. These results should not be surprising. Given the 
difficulties faced by outsiders in navigating and constructing effective inter-elite 
relationships in the regions, it is plausible to expect that only the more politically skillful 
outsiders are likely to stay in the region for long.  
 
Nonetheless, this finding does not apply to all indicators. Access to land and tax rates are 
perceived to be higher obstacles to business operations for insider governors with a short 
tenure and diminish in their importance as insider governors’ tenure increases (Tables 
A5.10 and A5.14 in the online appendix). The number of days to get operating license tends 
to decline faster with governors’ tenure in insider-controlled regions (Table A5.4 in the 
online appendix). And the length of tenure of the insider governors is associated with lower 
corruption perceptions in the regions (Tables A5.30-A5.32 in the online appendix).  
 
7. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
The institutional business environment in Russia is notoriously challenging and has long 
been characterized by high risks of predation from both the state officials and private 
                                                        
13 Ai and Norton (2003) showed that interaction terms in non-linear models, such as logit or ordered logit 
cannot be interpreted similarly to interaction terms in linear models. To ensure tractability of interaction 
term in these non-linear models similar to linear models, we code the interaction term in STATA using # 
operator, as shown by Pinzon (2016).  
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actors as well as by lacking infrastructure and widespread corruption. Such an 
environment does not reward economic efficiency and fair competition but promotes links 
to and dependence on the state.  The role of regional executive authority in such business 
environment is critical. This study of regional variation in business climate in Russia 
highlights the role of regional governors along with their teams and administrative stability 
for business climate in Russia’s regions. As expected, Russian firms reveal a strong 
preference for a more stable and predictable environment and intense dislike of political 
change on the regional level that is shaped by the continuity of regional administration. 
Additionally, they have shown strong preference for locally-embedded authorities arguably 
reflecting the significance of the local social capital and pre-existing inter-elite connections 
for state-business relations in the regions.    
 
The central finding of this study about the significance of administrative continuity for 
broader institutional environment and business climate in Russia’s regions is supported by 
other recent studies. Bruno et al. (2013), for example, have demonstrated that industries 
normally characterized by low entry barriers have lower entry rates in regions 
characterized by greater political discontinuity.  This effect is especially pronounced for 
medium and large firms that are more likely to depend on access to administrative 
resources and personal links to government officials.  The level of complaints associated 
with firms in regions of the first quartile, as discussed in our analysis, therefore should be 
taken seriously -- the complaints are accompanied by falling new firms entry rates into the 
regional economy. 
 
The significance of governor origin and the benefits of having a local governor revealed in 
the study arguably highlight further the importance of personalized exchange relations and 
informal links possessed by locals but not by outsiders.  The lower perceptions of most 
obstacles to business associated with local governors combined with more favorable 
perceptions about corruption and lower perceptions of state capture (especially at short 
tenure) are also indicative of the likely selection and adaptation processes the regional 
firms have undergone under local governors.  It seems plausible to suggest that varyags, 
given their executive powers and the lack of local knowledge and local connections, 
threaten to dismantle whatever arrangements that have emerged in the regions and thus 
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be a source of acute insecurity for local business actors.  It might also indicate that the 
firms that have been pessimistic on corruption issues all along would expect higher 
corruption margins from the outsider governors just because they are an ‘unknown evil’ as 
compared to the ‘known local evil.’ In such circumstances, one may expect that firms’ 
insecurities would be reflected in their unhappiness with the state of corruption, state 
capture, and more generally the operation of any state agency they interact with.  Skillful 
outsiders can integrate into regional elite with time. On almost all obstacle indicators 
outsider governors with long tenure are associated with more positive trends than insider 
governors. Such shifting perceptions might, on the one hand, reflect a much higher degree 
of anxiety firms experience when the feared political transition is combined with an 
unknown person brought to power. When the ‘unknown evil’ turns into a known governor 
who can constructively engage with regional businesses, firms’ perceptions of many 
obstacles change positively. However, this may also reflect the tougher requirements 
applied to the outsider governors wishing to keep their positions.  It is easier for the local 
elites to purge outsiders, which means that those surviving are more capable of ‘getting 
things done.’ This gets captured through the firms’ more favorable perceptions of local 
business environment. 
 
The sensitivity analysis of the non-linear effect of gubernatorial tenure informs further that 
a simple conclusion about the benefits of a longer gubernatorial stay in power on business 
climate would be inaccurate. The analysis of the effect of tenure broken into quartiles 
reveals that firms display an unusually high degree of discontent associated with very short 
tenure.  The levels of complaints emerging from the regions that have undergone political 
discontinuity as expressed through gubernatorial change (firms from the regions of the 
first quartile in tenure, where governors have served under one year) are by far higher 
than in any other regions. This initial anxiety seems to go away quickly because, in regions 
with governors serving between one and three years (second quartile), firms display 
higher confidence on many issues. As discussed above, the causes of such anxiety might be 
on the surface. In the larger environment characterized by the prevalence of personal 
relations and arbitrary application of formal rules and regulations, the situation of political 
shake-up throws all the previous agreements and relationships in the air, producing 
uncertainty and unpredictability for economic actors. Many of these firms depend on the 
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good will of the regional administration for obtaining licenses, construction permits and 
going through various other bureaucratic hurdles associated with doing business in Russia. 
Some might rely on political connections to benefit from government-funded contracts and 
projects.  Therefore, political transitions raise truly ‘existential’ threats to businesses and 
the firms’ answers to survey questions reveal that.  Additionally, administrative 
discontinuity is likely to result in policy inconsistency, a factor that has been shown to be 
directly linked to firm growth and well-being (Ayyagari et al. 2008).    
 
The analysis produces a more mixed picture on corruption. On the one hand, firms report 
higher real and perceived corruption levels in regions with shorter-tenured governors, 
which might be reflective not only of perceived risks associated with political transitions 
but also of a more fragmented nature of political authority in such regions and, hence, a 
more decentralized and pernicious corruption firms react against. At the same time, in 
some important areas of economic activity administrative continuity comes at a price and 
longer tenure means increasing corruption levels. This applies specifically to the 
construction sector as firms in regions with longer serving governors report significantly 
higher expectations of the need for informal payments to get construction permits. 
Nonetheless, on most other business environment indicators administrative continuity is 
associated with more content firms. It could be suggested that administrative continuity 
results in such a symbiosis between the regional government and businesses and such a 
degree of habituation to corruption patterns that the firms in regions where governors are 
serving more than ten years appreciate the predictability and the potential support of 
regional authorities so that corruption is seen as an additional tax on production (which all 
of them tend to complain about anyway). Their very existence as firms on the regional 
scene might be indicative of their access to and dependence on administrative resources, 
which they would want to defend and use against potential challengers.  In such 
circumstances, close links between these firms and the government would work to exclude 
competitors from entering the market.  
 
What should policy-making priorities be in such a crony capitalist environment?  The 
central question arguably is whether this institutional environment underpinning firms’ 
operation is amenable to change in a wholesale fashion.  If such comprehensive reforms are 
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not conceivable in the short-term, whether for the lack of political will or the absence of a 
clear template for such reforms, a policy-maker might find it more useful to support 
economic development in the sub-optimal conditions of crony capitalism, in the hopes that 
such economic growth – if provisions are made for it to be equitable - might create new 
social conditions that would allow for the creation of a broadly-based political coalition 
promoting institutional changes.  In such a scenario, it would be imperative to study more 
in-depth the particular economic success cases and try to discern the underpinnings of 
these successes.  For example, getting access to federal funds in support of regional 
projects appears to be one of the means for bolstering regional governors’ support and 
recognition from regional economic elites.  An exploration of lobbying strategies of regional 
elites and another rationale behind intergovernmental transfers, especially the part of 
transfers that is more politically sensitive, might provide further clues to regional success 
cases.   
 
Another promising research direction is the assessment of regional bureaucratic capacity 
and rule-making and their effects on regional economic prospects and business 
environment.  These factors might be especially important for small business development, 
an underdeveloped sector in Russia (Beazer and Duvanova 2014).  Additionally, it might be 
worthwhile to consider more ‘piecemeal’ reforms to some of the outstanding problems of 
the existing institutional order in Russia. Finding ways to reduce corruption levels while 
keeping the benefits of political stability might be a challenging task, but one that brings 
significant benefits to regions that managed to achieve it and therefore worthwhile of 
further exploration.  
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ONLINE APPENDIX  
 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for Key Explanatory Variables (BEEPS regions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
* - mean over a range of firm interview dates in each region  
** - regional insiders are coded 1; regional outsiders are coded 0.  
 
Table A2 Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Governor Tenure Governor Origin 
Governor Tenure 1 
 Governor Origin 0.22** 1 
 
Table A3 Governor Tenure Quartile Distribution 
 
Quartile Tenure (months) 
1 10-23 
2 24-47 
3 48-134 
4 135-244 
Region Governor 
Tenure* 
(months) 
Governor 
Origin** 
 Region Governor 
Tenure (months) 
Governor  
Origin* 
Bashkortostan 16      0    Novosibirsk 
oblast 
14      1 
Belgorod oblast 214      1  Omsk oblast 240      1 
Chelyabinsk oblast 19      1  Perm krai 69      1 
Irkutsk oblast 28      0  Primorskii krai 124      1 
Kaliningrad oblast 14      1  Rostov oblast 17      0 
Kaluga oblast 134      1  Sakha (Yakutia) 18      1 
Kemerovo oblast 175      1  Samara oblast 49      0 
Khabarovsk krai 31      1  Smolensk oblast 47      1 
Kirov oblast 36      0  St. Petersburg  97      0 
Krasnodar krai 131      1  Stavropol krai 41      1 
Krasnoyarsk krai 22      1  Sverdlovsk oblast 25      0 
Kursk oblast 132      1  Tatarstan  19      1 
Leningrad oblast 148      1  Tomsk oblast 192      1 
Lipetsk oblast 164      1  Tver oblast 96      0 
Mordovia  194      1  Ulyanovsk oblast 84      1 
Moscow city 14      0  Volgograd oblast 24      1 
Moscow oblast 142      0  Voronezh oblast 31      0 
Murmansk oblast 34      0  Yaroslavl oblast 47      1 
Nizhny Novgorod  65      0     
 29 
Table A4.1 – Continuous indicators of business environment  
 
 Total Obs  Censored Obs Uncensored Obs 
N  Percent Mean Std. Dev. 
% of total annual sales paid as informal payment/gift (j7a) 
 
4132 854 20.6% 0.9 4.0 
% of manager time spent on regulations (j2) 4220 460 10.9% 17.36 21.51 
Number of tax inspections, last year (j4) 2083 149 7.15% 2.88 4.16 
Number of days to get operating license (j14) 944 69 7.3% 53.2 65.2 
Note. Censored observations include such answers as ‘Don’t know” and “Refused to answer”  
 
Table A4.2 - Yes / No questions 
 
 N Mean Std. Dev. 
Received subsidies from the national, regional, local 
government or the EU sources (ECAq53) 
4182 0.04 0.20 
Informal payments expected at tax meetings (j5) 1948 0.04 0.20 
Informal payment expected to get an operating 
license (j15) 
906 0.09 0.29 
Informal payment expected to get construction 
permit (g4) 
394 0.24 0.43 
Corruption is number 1 obstacle (m1adum6) 4220 0.07 0.26 
 
Table A4.3 - obstacles to Firms' Operations 
 
  Does 
not 
apply 
No 
obstacle 
Minor 
obstacle 
Moderate 
obstacle 
Major 
obstacle 
Very 
severe 
obstacle 
Total 
Customs and trade 
regulations (d30b) 
N 724 2,492 240 320 239 129 4144 
Percent 17.47 60.14 5.79 7.72 5.77 3.11 100 
Access to land (g30a) N 367 2,463 253 353 376 273 4085 
Percent 8.98 60.29 6.19 8.64 9.2 6.68 99.98 
Access to finance 
(k30a) 
N 37 1,699 633 805 641 303 4118 
Percent 0.9 41.26 15.37 19.55 15.57 7.36 100.01 
Crime, theft and 
disorder (i30) 
N 98 2,474 687 448 326 161 4,194 
Percent 2.34 58.99 16.38 10.68 7.77 3.84 100 
Tax rates (j30a) N 0 524 323 915 1,345 1,064 4,171 
Percent 0 12.56 7.74 21.94 32.25 25.51 100 
Tax administration 
(j30b) 
N 2 2,174 724 729 360 187 4,176 
Percent 0.05 52.06 17.34 17.46 8.62 4.48 100 
Business licensing and 
permits (j30c) 
N 353 2,558 330 365 346 204 4,156 
Percent 8.49 61.55 7.94 8.78 8.33 4.91 100 
Political instability 
(j30e) 
N 0 1,766 570 791 670 293 4,128 
Percent 0 42.78 13.81 19.16 16.23 7.1 100 
Corruption (j30f) N 65 1,745 507 642 668 407 4,034 
Percent 1.61 43.26 12.57 15.91 16.56 10.09 100 
Courts (h30) N 136 2,987 372 300 215 78 4,088 
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Percent 3.33 73.07 9.1 7.34 5.26 1.91 100 
Labor regulations (l30a) N 4 2,901 543 496 195 51 4,190 
Percent 0.1 69.24 12.96 11.84 4.65 1.22 100 
Uneducated workforce 
(l30b) 
N 21 1,781 584 765 723 313 4,187 
Percent 0.5 42.54 13.95 18.27 17.27 7.48 100 
 
Table A4.4 – Vignette questions 
 
  Does not 
apply 
No 
obstacle 
Minor 
obstacle 
Moderate 
obstacle 
Major 
obstacle 
Very 
severe 
obstacle 
Total 
vin1a N 109 1,011 1,013 945 521 183 3,782 
 Percent 2.88 26.73 26.78 24.99 13.78 4.84 100 
vin1b N 108 918 746 1,109 711 205 3,797 
 Percent 2.84 24.18 19.65 29.21 18.73 5.4 100 
vin1c N 113 192 270 700 1,260 1,269 3,804 
 Percent 2.97 5.05 7.1 18.4 33.12 33.36 100 
vin1d N 115 275 364 922 1,299 827 3,802 
 Percent 3.02 7.23 9.57 24.25 34.17 21.75 100 
vin1e N 115 196 188 526 1,103 1,623 3,751 
 Percent 3.07 5.23 5.01 14.02 29.41 43.27 100 
 
Table A4.5 - Court System Is 
 
 Fair, impartial and 
uncorrupted (h7a) 
Quick (ECAj1b) Able to enforce its 
decisions (ECAj1c) 
 N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Strongly disagree 989 26.09 994 26.34 698 18.62 
Tend to disagree 1,527 40.28 1,548 41.02 1,145 30.54 
Tend to agree 1,017 26.83 996 26.39 1,477 39.4 
Strongly agree 258 6.81 236 6.25 429 11.44 
Total 3,791 100 3,774 100 3,749 100 
 
Table A4.6- Informal Payments Expected 
 
 Overall (ECAq39) Customs / imports 
(ECAq41a) 
Courts (ECAq41b) Tax collection 
(ECAq41c) 
 N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Never 1,686 43.92 2,699 77.14 2,684 75.03 2,522 67.42 
Seldom 633 16.49 283 8.09 367 10.26 494 13.21 
Sometimes 803 20.92 288 8.23 308 8.61 457 12.22 
Frequently 468 12.19 161 4.6 169 4.72 199 5.32 
Very frequently 118 3.07 34 0.97 29 0.81 41 1.1 
Always 131 3.41 34 0.97 20 0.56 28 0.75 
Total 3,839 100 3,499 100 3,577 100 3,741 100 
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Table A4.7 Impact of Informal Payments to: 
 
 Parliamentarians 
(ECAq44a) 
Government officials 
(ECAq44b) 
Regional / local officials 
(ECAq44c) 
 N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Does not apply 636 16.45 648 16.83 526 13.66 
No impact 2,469 63.86 2,416 62.75 2,444 63.48 
Minor impact 263 6.8 266 6.91 298 7.74 
Moderate impact 315 8.15 311 8.08 353 9.17 
Major impact 157 4.06 184 4.78 189 4.91 
Decisive impact 26 0.67 25 0.65 40 1.04 
Total 3,866 100 3,850 100 3,850 100 
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coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.074 0.050 0.130 0.211 -0.085* 0.048 -0.076 0.050
Governor's tenure (log) -0.058** 0.028 -0.026 0.048
Governor: origin X tenure -0.055 0.058
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.140** 0.069
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile 0.044 0.070
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile -0.022 0.060
Governor's tenure (months) -0.002 0.001
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.000004 0.000005
size: less than 20 employees -0.143** 0.057 -0.166** 0.082 -0.145** 0.057 -0.166** 0.082 -0.139** 0.057 -0.166** 0.082 -0.145** 0.057 -0.166** 0.082
size: 20-99 employees -0.073 0.055 -0.110 0.080 -0.074 0.055 -0.110 0.080 -0.074 0.055 -0.110 0.080 -0.074 0.055 -0.110 0.080
age: 1-6 yrs 0.065 0.055 0.126 0.078 0.065 0.055 0.126 0.078 0.069 0.054 0.127 0.078 0.068 0.056 0.126 0.078
age: 7-9 yrs 0.119** 0.054 0.108 0.078 0.119** 0.054 0.108 0.078 0.118** 0.053 0.108 0.078 0.122** 0.054 0.108 0.078
age: 10-15 yrs 0.014 0.050 -0.050 0.070 0.013 0.049 -0.050 0.070 0.012 0.050 -0.050 0.070 0.014 0.050 -0.050 0.070
exports >5% of sales -0.040 0.057 0.118 0.088 -0.042 0.057 0.118 0.088 -0.038 0.058 0.118 0.088 -0.040 0.057 0.118 0.088
export status unknown or missing 0.019 0.268 -0.029 0.358 0.008 0.258 -0.029 0.358 0.039 0.269 -0.031 0.358 0.014 0.267 -0.029 0.358
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.002 0.101 -0.068 0.150 0.008 0.102 -0.068 0.151 -0.015 0.102 -0.068 0.151 -0.000 0.102 -0.069 0.150
state owns more than 10% 0.523*** 0.108 -1.072** 0.455 0.540*** 0.111 -1.072** 0.455 0.483*** 0.110 -1.071** 0.454 0.534*** 0.110 -1.072** 0.455
ownership status unknown or missing 0.215 0.160 0.178 0.221 0.214 0.161 0.178 0.221 0.199 0.163 0.178 0.221 0.216 0.160 0.177 0.221
log of GRP for 2010 -0.218* 0.120 0.144 0.153 -0.266** 0.130 0.144 0.153 -0.216* 0.120 0.144 0.153 -0.219* 0.120 0.144 0.153
% self-identifying as Russian 0.004*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.002 0.004*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.002 0.007*** 0.002 0.004*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.002
% construction in GRP value-added 0.001 0.006 -0.0004 0.010 0.003 0.007 -0.000 0.010 -0.000 0.007 -0.0004 0.010 0.001 0.006 -0.0004 0.010
% retail in GRP value-added 0.011 0.007 -0.041*** 0.009 0.010 0.007 -0.041*** 0.009 0.010 0.007 -0.041*** 0.009 0.011 0.007 -0.041*** 0.009
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.008* 0.004 -0.018*** 0.006 0.009** 0.004 -0.018*** 0.006 0.007 0.004 -0.018*** 0.006 0.008* 0.004 -0.018*** 0.006
sector: light manufacturing -0.050 0.056 0.014 0.085 -0.044 0.056 0.014 0.085 -0.049 0.056 0.014 0.085 -0.049 0.056 0.014 0.085
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.037 0.056 -0.013 0.081 -0.031 0.056 -0.013 0.081 -0.035 0.055 -0.013 0.081 -0.036 0.056 -0.013 0.081
sector: machinery and electronics 0.112 0.080 -0.192* 0.104 0.119 0.080 -0.192* 0.104 0.112 0.080 -0.192* 0.104 0.110 0.080 -0.192* 0.104
sector: services -0.013 0.051 -0.010 0.077 -0.010 0.051 -0.010 0.077 -0.014 0.051 -0.010 0.077 -0.014 0.051 -0.010 0.077
sector: construction -0.003 0.055 0.073 0.092 -0.001 0.055 0.073 0.092 0.002 0.055 0.072 0.092 -0.002 0.055 0.073 0.092
population per sq. km -0.000002 0.000032 0.000035 0.000033 0.000007 0.000034 0.000035 0.000033 -0.000002 0.000033 0.000035 0.000033 -0.000002 0.000033 0.000035 0.000033
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes 0.049 0.053 0.205*** 0.064 0.040 0.054 0.205*** 0.064 0.057 0.052 0.205*** 0.064 0.064 0.053 0.205*** 0.064
Estimates computed with some precision (1= Yes) 0.146** 0.059 0.144** 0.059 0.147** 0.059 0.145** 0.059
Arbitrary and unreliable numbers (1=Yes) 0.187 0.134 0.185 0.133 0.192 0.135 0.185 0.133
Partially taken from the records and partially estimated: 1=Yes 0.250*** 0.087 0.250*** 0.087 0.249*** 0.086 0.250*** 0.087
Amongst the owners of the firm, are there any females? 1 = Yes -0.027 0.056 -0.027 0.056 -0.027 0.056 -0.027 0.056
Top Manager's number of yrs of experience working in this sector 0.0005 0.003 0.0005 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.0005 0.003
Female Top Manager? 1=Yes -0.161** 0.067 -0.161** 0.067 -0.162** 0.067 -0.161** 0.067
Have an internationally-recognized quality certification? 1=Yes 0.064 0.075 0.064 0.075 0.064 0.075 0.064 0.075
constant -6.068*** 1.488 -2.616 1.775 -5.599*** 1.564 -2.616 1.774 -6.363*** 1.474 -2.617 1.775 -6.226*** 1.485 -2.615 1.775
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
lambda
lambda (se)
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-0.134** -0.133** -0.138** -0.131**
0.062 0.062 0.061 0.062
. . . .
. . . .
Selection Eq Main Eq Selection Eq
4,097 4,097 4,097 4,097
Main Eq Selection Eq Main Eq Selection Eq Main Eq
Table A5.1. Heckit Regressions: % of total annual sales paid as informal payment/gift (j7a)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.075*** 0.016 -0.093 0.077 -0.109*** 0.018 -0.094*** 0.016
Governor's tenure (log) -0.083*** 0.011 -0.088*** 0.020
Governor: origin X tenure 0.005 0.020
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.162*** 0.027
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile 0.048** 0.023
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.030 0.020
Governor's tenure (months) -0.004*** 0.0005
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00001*** 0.000002
size: less than 20 employees -0.034 0.028 -0.140 0.092 -0.034 0.028 -0.140 0.092 -0.039 0.028 -0.140 0.092 -0.034 0.027 -0.140 0.092
size: 20-99 employees -0.013 0.028 -0.115 0.091 -0.013 0.028 -0.115 0.091 -0.017 0.028 -0.115 0.091 -0.012 0.027 -0.115 0.091
age: 1-6 yrs -0.063** 0.026 0.001 0.090 -0.063** 0.026 0.001 0.090 -0.039 0.027 0.001 0.090 -0.051** 0.026 0.001 0.090
age: 7-9 yrs -0.051* 0.027 0.034 0.091 -0.051* 0.027 0.034 0.091 -0.036 0.027 0.034 0.091 -0.044* 0.026 0.034 0.091
age: 10-15 yrs -0.027 0.025 0.083 0.082 -0.027 0.025 0.083 0.082 -0.019 0.025 0.083 0.082 -0.019 0.024 0.083 0.082
exports >5% of sales -0.020 0.031 -0.037 0.104 -0.020 0.031 -0.037 0.104 -0.019 0.031 -0.037 0.104 -0.019 0.030 -0.037 0.104
export status unknown or missing 0.199** 0.097 0.749** 0.321 0.199** 0.096 0.749** 0.321 0.189* 0.097 0.749** 0.321 0.200** 0.093 0.749** 0.321
foreign actors own more than 10% 0.096** 0.048 0.314** 0.154 0.097** 0.048 0.314** 0.154 0.100** 0.048 0.314** 0.154 0.104** 0.046 0.314** 0.154
state owns more than 10% -0.074 0.098 -0.081 0.323 -0.074 0.098 -0.081 0.323 -0.055 0.098 -0.081 0.323 -0.081 0.094 -0.081 0.323
ownership status unknown or missing 0.062 0.072 0.587** 0.235 0.061 0.072 0.587** 0.235 0.051 0.072 0.587** 0.235 0.062 0.069 0.587** 0.235
log of GRP for 2010 -0.742*** 0.017 -0.480*** 0.146 -0.741*** 0.018 -0.480*** 0.146 -0.777*** 0.017 -0.480*** 0.146 -0.769*** 0.016 -0.480*** 0.146
% self-identifying as Russian 0.003*** 0.001 0.014*** 0.003 0.003*** 0.001 0.014*** 0.003 0.003*** 0.001 0.014*** 0.003 0.004*** 0.001 0.014*** 0.003
% construction in GRP value-added 0.021*** 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.021*** 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.020*** 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.028*** 0.003 0.010 0.009
% retail in GRP value-added -0.022*** 0.003 -0.021** 0.009 -0.022*** 0.003 -0.021** 0.009 -0.021*** 0.003 -0.021** 0.009 -0.021*** 0.003 -0.021** 0.009
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.015*** 0.002 0.022*** 0.005 0.015*** 0.002 0.022*** 0.005 0.015*** 0.002 0.022*** 0.005 0.017*** 0.002 0.022*** 0.005
sector: light manufacturing 0.005 0.028 -0.020 0.091 0.005 0.028 -0.020 0.091 -0.001 0.028 -0.020 0.091 -0.002 0.027 -0.020 0.091
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.013 0.026 0.040 0.088 -0.013 0.026 0.040 0.088 -0.015 0.026 0.040 0.088 -0.019 0.025 0.040 0.088
sector: machinery and electronics -0.009 0.033 -0.027 0.111 -0.010 0.033 -0.027 0.111 -0.009 0.033 -0.027 0.111 -0.010 0.032 -0.027 0.111
sector: services 0.007 0.024 0.070 0.078 0.007 0.024 0.070 0.078 0.000 0.024 0.070 0.078 0.006 0.023 0.070 0.078
sector: construction -0.018 0.028 -0.029 0.096 -0.017 0.028 -0.029 0.096 -0.022 0.028 -0.029 0.096 -0.012 0.027 -0.029 0.096
population per sq. km 0.00015*** 0.00001*** 0.00007*** 0.00004*** 0.00015*** 0.00001*** 0.00007*** 0.00004*** 0.00015*** 0.00001*** 0.00007*** 0.00004*** 0.00016*** 0.00001*** 0.00007*** 0.00004***
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.093*** 0.025 0.025 0.069 -0.092*** 0.025 0.025 0.069 -0.047* 0.025 0.025 0.069 -0.070*** 0.025 0.025 0.069
Estimates computed with some precision (1= Yes) 0.253*** 0.065 0.253*** 0.065 0.253*** 0.065 0.253*** 0.065
Arbitrary and unreliable numbers (1=Yes) 0.490*** 0.116 0.490*** 0.116 0.490*** 0.116 0.490*** 0.116
Partially taken from the records and partially estimated: 1=Yes 0.148 0.091 0.148 0.091 0.148 0.091 0.148 0.091
Amongst the owners of the firm, are there any females? 1 = Yes 0.043 0.067 0.043 0.067 0.043 0.067 0.043 0.067
Top Manager's number of yrs of experience working in this sector -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003
Female Top Manager? 1=Yes 0.060 0.077 0.060 0.077 0.060 0.077 0.060 0.077
Have an internationally-recognized quality certification? 1=Yes 0.129 0.085 0.129 0.085 0.129 0.085 0.129 0.085
constant 3.422* 1.771 3.422* 1.771 3.422* 1.771 3.422* 1.771
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
lambda
lambda (se)
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.067 0.066 0.067 0.064
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.265*** 0.265*** 0.265*** 0.254***
4,185 4,185 4,185 4,185
28,123.950 28,257.388 28,200.646 30,607.356
Main Eq Selection Eq Main Eq Selection Eq
Table A5.2. Heckit Regressions: manager time spent on regulations (j2)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
Main Eq Selection Eq Main Eq Selection Eq
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coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.041 0.031 -0.160 0.147 -0.054 0.035 -0.056* 0.031
Governor's tenure (log) -0.068*** 0.018 -0.096** 0.038
Governor: origin X tenure 0.033 0.040
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.115** 0.047
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile 0.065 0.046
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.005 0.040
Governor's tenure (months) -0.003*** 0.001
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00001*** 0.000003***
size: less than 20 employees 0.066 0.047 -0.226* 0.131 0.068 0.046 -0.226* 0.131 0.067 0.048 -0.226* 0.131 0.062 0.045 -0.226* 0.131
size: 20-99 employees 0.061 0.045 -0.187 0.124 0.060 0.044 -0.187 0.124 0.061 0.045 -0.187 0.124 0.054 0.043 -0.187 0.124
age: 1-6 yrs 0.042 0.053 -0.160 0.145 0.043 0.051 -0.160 0.145 0.059 0.053 -0.160 0.145 0.048 0.050 -0.160 0.145
age: 7-9 yrs 0.042 0.055 -0.182 0.148 0.044 0.054 -0.182 0.148 0.052 0.056 -0.182 0.148 0.034 0.053 -0.182 0.148
age: 10-15 yrs -0.072 0.045 0.163 0.124 -0.069 0.044 0.163 0.124 -0.065 0.045 0.163 0.124 -0.059 0.043 0.163 0.124
exports >5% of sales -0.020 0.054 -0.013 0.154 -0.014 0.054 -0.013 0.154 -0.021 0.055 -0.013 0.154 -0.020 0.052 -0.013 0.154
foreign actors own more than 10% 0.034 0.087 0.006 0.240 0.028 0.085 0.006 0.240 0.015 0.089 0.006 0.240 0.018 0.083 0.006 0.240
state owns more than 10% 0.308* 0.181 -0.138 0.501 0.345* 0.183 -0.138 0.501 0.298 0.184 -0.138 0.501 0.376** 0.175 -0.138 0.501
ownership status unknown or missing -0.064 0.147 0.106 0.412 -0.049 0.145 0.106 0.412 -0.068 0.149 0.106 0.412 -0.048 0.141 0.106 0.412
log of GRP for 2010 -0.666*** 0.024 0.080 0.235 -0.660*** 0.024 0.080 0.235 -0.691*** 0.024 0.080 0.235 -0.689*** 0.023 0.080 0.235
% self-identifying as Russian 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.000 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004
% construction in GRP value-added 0.017*** 0.005 -0.010 0.015 0.017*** 0.005 -0.010 0.015 0.016*** 0.006 -0.010 0.015 0.022*** 0.006 -0.010 0.015
% retail in GRP value-added -0.007 0.005 0.014 0.014 -0.006 0.005 0.014 0.014 -0.006 0.005 0.014 0.014 -0.005 0.005 0.014 0.014
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.009*** 0.003 0.019** 0.008 0.009*** 0.003 0.019** 0.008 0.009*** 0.003 0.019** 0.008 0.011*** 0.003 0.019** 0.008
sector: light manufacturing -0.059 0.053 0.227 0.141 -0.057 0.051 0.227 0.141 -0.064 0.053 0.227 0.141 -0.069 0.050 0.227 0.141
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.073 0.050 0.261** 0.133 -0.073 0.049 0.261** 0.133 -0.081 0.050 0.261** 0.133 -0.074 0.047 0.261** 0.133
sector: machinery and electronics -0.038 0.060 0.190 0.163 -0.037 0.058 0.190 0.163 -0.047 0.060 0.190 0.163 -0.039 0.057 0.190 0.163
sector: services -0.018 0.052 -0.049 0.141 -0.020 0.051 -0.049 0.141 -0.019 0.052 -0.049 0.141 -0.025 0.049 -0.049 0.141
sector: construction -0.028 0.056 -0.019 0.163 -0.025 0.055 -0.019 0.163 -0.029 0.057 -0.019 0.163 -0.021 0.054 -0.019 0.163
population per sq. km 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.041 0.047 -0.102 0.112 -0.038 0.046 -0.102 0.112 -0.004 0.047 -0.102 0.112 -0.015 0.046 -0.102 0.112
Estimates computed with some precision (1= Yes) 0.192* 0.103 0.192* 0.103 0.192* 0.103 0.192* 0.103
Arbitrary and unreliable numbers (1=Yes) 0.596*** 0.185 0.596*** 0.185 0.596*** 0.185 0.596*** 0.185
Partially taken from the records and partially estimated: 1=Yes -0.110 0.160 -0.110 0.160 -0.110 0.160 -0.110 0.160
Amongst the owners of the firm, are there any females? 1 = Yes -0.120 0.111 -0.120 0.111 -0.120 0.111 -0.120 0.111
Top Manager's number of yrs of experience working in this 
sector
-0.003 0.005 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 0.005
Female Top Manager? 1=Yes -0.036 0.131 -0.036 0.131 -0.036 0.131 -0.036 0.131
Have an internationally-recognized quality certification? 1=Yes 0.042 0.129 0.042 0.129 0.042 0.129 0.042 0.129
constant -2.830 2.814 -2.830 2.814 -2.830 2.814 -2.830 2.814
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
lambda
lambda (se)
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.094 0.092 0.097 0.091
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.299*** -0.292*** -0.303*** -0.286***
2,070 2,070 2,070 2,070
6,920 7,251 6,758 7,589
Main Eq Selection Eq Main Eq Selection Eq
Table A5.3. Heckit Regressions: #tax inspections, last year (j4)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
Main Eq Selection Eq Main Eq Selection Eq
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coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.098** 0.045 0.246 0.207 -0.177*** 0.048 -0.103** 0.051
Governor's tenure (log) -0.068** 0.028 -0.002 0.048
Governor: origin X tenure -0.092* 0.054
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.051 0.067
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.073 0.060
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile -0.147*** 0.053
Governor's tenure (months) -0.002 0.002
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00001 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees 0.043 0.070 -0.522** 0.207 0.018 0.070 -0.522** 0.207 0.074 0.073 -0.522** 0.207 0.061 0.074 -0.522** 0.207
size: 20-99 employees 0.025 0.057 -0.289 0.191 0.017 0.057 -0.289 0.191 0.062 0.060 -0.289 0.191 0.037 0.061 -0.289 0.191
age: 1-6 yrs -0.115* 0.068 0.123 0.216 -0.124* 0.067 0.123 0.216 -0.071 0.070 0.123 0.216 -0.091 0.071 0.123 0.216
age: 7-9 yrs -0.023 0.075 -0.029 0.228 -0.033 0.074 -0.029 0.228 0.025 0.076 -0.029 0.228 -0.004 0.079 -0.029 0.228
age: 10-15 yrs -0.051 0.061 0.181 0.192 -0.050 0.060 0.181 0.192 -0.037 0.064 0.181 0.192 -0.042 0.065 0.181 0.192
exports >5% of sales 0.089 0.069 0.045 0.251 0.061 0.070 0.045 0.251 0.059 0.078 0.045 0.251 0.104 0.073 0.045 0.251
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.056 0.170 -0.473 0.463 -0.048 0.167 -0.473 0.463 -0.084 0.169 -0.473 0.463 -0.066 0.177 -0.473 0.463
ownership status unknown or missing -0.169 0.153 0.153 0.586 -0.184 0.151 0.153 0.586 -0.037 0.172 0.153 0.586 -0.149 0.167 0.153 0.586
log of GRP for 2010 -0.693*** 0.033 0.510 0.366 -0.716*** 0.035 0.510 0.366 -0.705*** 0.034 0.510 0.366 -0.705*** 0.035 0.510 0.366
% self-identifying as Russian 0.001 0.003 0.014** 0.007 0.002 0.003 0.014** 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.014** 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.014** 0.007
% construction in GRP value-added 0.016** 0.008 0.025 0.022 0.018** 0.007 0.025 0.022 0.016** 0.008 0.025 0.022 0.016** 0.008 0.025 0.022
% retail in GRP value-added -0.007 0.005 -0.001 0.020 -0.009* 0.005 -0.001 0.020 -0.008 0.006 -0.001 0.020 -0.007 0.006 -0.001 0.020
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.016*** 0.004 -0.002 0.014 0.017*** 0.004 -0.002 0.014 0.016*** 0.004 -0.002 0.014 0.016*** 0.004 -0.002 0.014
sector: light manufacturing 0.015 0.075 -0.012 0.264 0.018 0.074 -0.012 0.264 0.010 0.080 -0.012 0.264 0.014 0.080 -0.012 0.264
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.050 0.080 -0.205 0.235 -0.036 0.079 -0.205 0.235 -0.033 0.082 -0.205 0.235 -0.029 0.083 -0.205 0.235
sector: machinery and electronics 0.024 0.087 -0.609** 0.286 0.026 0.085 -0.609** 0.286 0.072 0.092 -0.609** 0.286 0.018 0.092 -0.609** 0.286
sector: services 0.036 0.051 0.028 0.182 0.026 0.050 0.028 0.182 0.022 0.054 0.028 0.182 0.035 0.053 0.028 0.182
sector: construction 0.082 0.053 -0.260 0.202 0.063 0.053 -0.260 0.202 0.115** 0.058 -0.260 0.202 0.091 0.057 -0.260 0.202
population per sq. km 0.00012*** 0.00002*** -0.00007*** 0.00008*** 0.00014*** 0.00002*** -0.00007*** 0.00008*** 0.00012*** 0.00002*** -0.00007*** 0.00008*** 0.00013*** 0.00002*** -0.00007*** 0.00008***
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.024 0.055 0.009 0.169 -0.030 0.054 0.009 0.169 0.059 0.057 0.009 0.169 -0.002 0.059 0.009 0.169
Estimates computed with some precision (1= Yes) 0.175 0.164 0.175 0.164 0.175 0.164 0.175 0.164
Arbitrary and unreliable numbers (1=Yes) 1.074*** 0.290 1.074*** 0.290 1.074*** 0.290 1.074*** 0.290
Partially taken from the records and partially estimated: 1=Yes 0.278 0.217 0.278 0.217 0.278 0.217 0.278 0.217
Amongst the owners of the firm, are there any females? 1 = Yes -0.104 0.171 -0.104 0.171 -0.104 0.171 -0.104 0.171
Top Manager's number of yrs of experience working in this sector -0.014* 0.008 -0.014* 0.008 -0.014* 0.008 -0.014* 0.008
Female Top Manager? 1=Yes 0.123 0.194 0.123 0.194 0.123 0.194 0.123 0.194
Have an internationally-recognized quality certification? 1=Yes 0.193 0.188 0.193 0.188 0.193 0.188 0.193 0.188
constant -8.812** 4.309 -8.812** 4.309 -8.812** 4.309 -8.812** 4.309
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
lambda
lambda (se)
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.081 0.079 0.084 0.086
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.147* -0.145* -0.201** -0.170**
941 941 941 941
11,473 11,885 9,699 10,105
Main Eq Selection Eq Main Eq Selection Eq
Table A5.4. Heckit Regressions: #days to get operating license (j14)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
Main Eq Selection Eq Main Eq Selection Eq
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.729** 0.307 -1.548 1.232 -0.710** 0.315 -0.731** 0.323
Governor's tenure (log) 0.126 0.197 -0.020 0.281
Governor: origin X tenure 0.220 0.303
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile -0.476 0.502
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.209 0.427
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile -0.214 0.366
Governor's tenure (months) 0.004 0.008
Governor's tenure squared (months) -0.00001 0.00003
size: less than 20 employees -0.264 0.349 -0.257 0.350 -0.253 0.349 -0.262 0.349
size: 20-99 employees -0.092 0.320 -0.089 0.320 -0.091 0.319 -0.092 0.319
age: 1-6 yrs -0.887** 0.403 -0.864** 0.404 -0.873** 0.411 -0.886** 0.407
age: 7-9 yrs -0.767** 0.374 -0.754** 0.376 -0.757** 0.377 -0.767** 0.378
age: 10-15 yrs -0.583* 0.333 -0.579* 0.336 -0.573* 0.335 -0.584* 0.332
exports >5% of sales 0.339 0.404 0.340 0.403 0.344 0.405 0.338 0.405
foreign actors own more than 10% 0.922* 0.504 0.908* 0.511 0.931* 0.505 0.921* 0.504
log of GRP for 2010 -0.761 0.586 -0.627 0.603 -0.759 0.559 -0.759 0.588
% self-identifying as Russian -0.005 0.010 -0.005 0.010 -0.007 0.011 -0.005 0.010
% construction in GRP value-added 0.033 0.042 0.028 0.041 0.034 0.043 0.032 0.044
% retail in GRP value-added 0.034 0.041 0.040 0.043 0.037 0.042 0.033 0.041
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.036* 0.022 0.034 0.022 0.036 0.022 0.036 0.022
sector: light manufacturing -0.139 0.366 -0.139 0.366 -0.132 0.361 -0.136 0.366
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.119 0.342 -0.121 0.343 -0.118 0.340 -0.118 0.341
sector: machinery and electronics -1.618** 0.735 -1.623** 0.735 -1.625** 0.737 -1.615** 0.735
sector: services -0.572 0.427 -0.570 0.428 -0.567 0.428 -0.570 0.427
sector: construction 0.145 0.398 0.148 0.398 0.151 0.393 0.145 0.397
population per sq. km 0.0000001 0.00014 -0.00005 0.00016 0.00001 0.00014 -0.000002 0.00014
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.342 0.401 -0.299 0.405 -0.307 0.398 -0.344 0.411
constant 6.630 7.123 5.382 7.215 7.418 6.726 6.953 7.063
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.045 0.045 0.046 0.045
39.3 39.5 39.7 39.8
0.009 0.013 0.016 0.011
1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900
Table A5.5. Logit Regressions: was bribe expected at tax meetings (j5)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.557 0.350 -1.152 1.200 -0.382 0.393 -0.475 0.369
Governor's tenure (log) 0.264 0.208 0.162 0.265
Governor: origin X tenure 0.156 0.302
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile -0.935* 0.524
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.251 0.415
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile -0.003 0.356
Governor's tenure (months) 0.012 0.009
Governor's tenure squared (months) -0.00005 0.00004
size: less than 20 employees -0.071 0.383 -0.063 0.382 -0.064 0.382 -0.065 0.384
size: 20-99 employees 0.068 0.333 0.074 0.333 0.073 0.333 0.070 0.333
age: 1-6 yrs -0.347 0.373 -0.344 0.372 -0.362 0.371 -0.406 0.379
age: 7-9 yrs 0.189 0.396 0.197 0.397 0.179 0.384 0.141 0.392
age: 10-15 yrs -0.096 0.316 -0.095 0.317 -0.056 0.317 -0.120 0.316
exports >5% of sales 1.012*** 0.327 1.013*** 0.326 1.048*** 0.327 0.995*** 0.328
export status unknown or missing 1.339 1.152 1.328 1.165 1.423 1.164 1.257 1.172
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.877 1.061 -0.885 1.063 -0.883 1.056 -0.855 1.061
state owns more than 10% 0.641 0.763 0.662 0.764 0.668 0.770 0.606 0.762
log of GRP for 2010 0.832 0.664 0.933 0.698 1.034 0.707 0.864 0.670
% self-identifying as Russian -0.007 0.010 -0.007 0.010 -0.014 0.012 -0.008 0.011
% construction in GRP value-added -0.025 0.051 -0.027 0.050 -0.033 0.051 -0.037 0.053
% retail in GRP value-added -0.032 0.038 -0.029 0.037 -0.023 0.040 -0.036 0.037
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.013 0.022 -0.014 0.022 -0.015 0.023 -0.016 0.023
sector: light manufacturing -0.005 0.437 -0.005 0.437 -0.040 0.434 -0.013 0.436
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.115 0.377 -0.117 0.376 -0.113 0.378 -0.118 0.378
sector: machinery and electronics -0.614 0.390 -0.612 0.388 -0.645* 0.385 -0.608 0.391
sector: services -1.341*** 0.467 -1.344*** 0.469 -1.340*** 0.469 -1.344*** 0.463
sector: construction -0.360 0.323 -0.359 0.323 -0.361 0.321 -0.378 0.321
population per sq. km -0.00003 0.00014 -0.00007 0.00014 -0.00005 0.00014 -0.00004 0.00014
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes 0.377 0.447 0.417 0.468 0.366 0.411 0.223 0.436
constant -12.020 8.270 -12.965 8.535 -12.740 8.324 -11.449 8.090
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.064 0.065 0.069 0.065
31.1 30.7 34.4 33.9
0.120 0.161 0.100 0.086
893 893 893 893
Table A5.6. Logit Regressions: was bribe expected to get operating license (j15)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.394 0.365 -2.050 1.433 -0.351 0.369 -0.241 0.365
Governor's tenure (log) 0.129 0.200 -0.204 0.359
Governor: origin X tenure 0.447 0.391
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.302 0.557
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile 0.230 0.509
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 1.571*** 0.420
Governor's tenure (months) 0.016* 0.010
Governor's tenure squared (months) -0.00008* 0.00004*
size: less than 20 employees 0.097 0.394 0.110 0.388 -0.026 0.420 0.041 0.401
size: 20-99 employees 0.377 0.327 0.391 0.322 0.424 0.343 0.369 0.331
age: 1-6 yrs -0.372 0.411 -0.381 0.413 -0.540 0.425 -0.480 0.416
age: 7-9 yrs -0.157 0.423 -0.157 0.427 -0.191 0.433 -0.222 0.416
age: 10-15 yrs -0.205 0.339 -0.196 0.343 -0.305 0.352 -0.273 0.334
exports >5% of sales 1.555*** 0.401 1.576*** 0.401 1.362*** 0.413 1.563*** 0.407
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.728 0.939 -0.700 0.957 -0.930 0.843 -0.801 0.922
log of GRP for 2010 1.767*** 0.682 2.089*** 0.736 2.465*** 0.788 1.771** 0.688
% self-identifying as Russian -0.015 0.011 -0.016 0.010 -0.020 0.012 -0.019* 0.011
%construction in GRP value-added -0.102* 0.058 -0.113** 0.057 -0.114** 0.049 -0.117** 0.055
%retail in GRP value-added -0.059 0.041 -0.044 0.044 -0.049 0.044 -0.058 0.040
%natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.071*** 0.027 -0.075*** 0.027 -0.083*** 0.031 -0.072** 0.028
sector: light manufacturing 0.059 0.433 0.015 0.438 0.034 0.436 0.001 0.426
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.912** 0.424 -0.954** 0.426 -0.799* 0.424 -0.971** 0.432
sector: machinery and electronics -0.726 0.574 -0.772 0.574 -0.618 0.576 -0.705 0.586
sector: services -0.245 0.438 -0.273 0.445 -0.305 0.433 -0.245 0.430
sector: construction -0.114 0.341 -0.148 0.344 -0.034 0.346 -0.091 0.344
population per sq. km -0.00054 0.00021 -0.00062 0.00021 -0.00083 0.00038 -0.00058 0.00026
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.504 0.413 -0.498 0.414 -0.823* 0.441 -0.795* 0.409
constant -19.321** 7.894 -22.165*** 8.269 -27.293*** 9.081 -18.623** 7.807
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.084 0.087 0.137 0.094
35.9 38.4 48.7 37.1
0.023 0.017 0.001 0.023
385 385 385 385
Table A5.7. Logit Regressions: was bribe expected for construction permit (g4)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.292* 0.162 -0.854 0.680 -0.349** 0.167 -0.345** 0.172
Governor's tenure (log) -0.192** 0.095 -0.298** 0.150
Governor: origin X tenure 0.154 0.177
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.092 0.239
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.013 0.225
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile -0.316 0.206
Governor's tenure (months) -0.011** 0.004
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00004** 0.00002**
size: less than 20 employees -0.017 0.203 -0.015 0.203 -0.006 0.204 -0.024 0.203
size: 20-99 employees 0.227 0.206 0.231 0.206 0.228 0.206 0.223 0.206
age: 1-6 yrs -0.033 0.188 -0.022 0.189 0.043 0.190 -0.010 0.190
age: 7-9 yrs -0.100 0.211 -0.094 0.211 -0.049 0.211 -0.088 0.210
age: 10-15 yrs 0.013 0.177 0.018 0.178 0.036 0.178 0.023 0.178
exports >5% of sales 0.328 0.207 0.330 0.206 0.329 0.207 0.335 0.207
foreign actors own more than 10% 0.061 0.358 0.052 0.359 0.053 0.359 0.053 0.360
ownership status unknown or missing -0.243 0.729 -0.232 0.729 -0.253 0.728 -0.244 0.731
log of GRP for 2010 -0.186 0.358 -0.083 0.376 -0.152 0.336 -0.207 0.362
% self-identifying as Russian 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.006
% construction in GRP value-added 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.025 0.021 0.024 0.038 0.026
% retail in GRP value-added -0.047* 0.024 -0.044* 0.024 -0.045** 0.023 -0.046* 0.024
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.003 0.014 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.013 0.005 0.014
sector: light manufacturing -0.084 0.208 -0.090 0.209 -0.075 0.209 -0.093 0.210
sector: heavy manufacturing 0.117 0.184 0.112 0.184 0.127 0.184 0.117 0.184
sector: machinery and electronics 0.530** 0.231 0.527** 0.231 0.524** 0.232 0.522** 0.231
sector: services -0.427** 0.209 -0.426** 0.209 -0.423** 0.208 -0.425** 0.209
sector: construction 0.427** 0.211 0.424** 0.211 0.439** 0.212 0.432** 0.211
population per sq. km 0.00009 0.00009 0.00006 0.00010 0.00008 0.00008 0.00010 0.00009
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes 0.004 0.184 0.029 0.186 0.185 0.197 0.084 0.193
constant 0.592 4.330 -0.336 4.469 -0.528 3.937 0.233 4.298
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.020 0.020 0.020 0.021
37.2 37.9 39.3 39.5
0.022 0.026 0.026 0.017
4,135 4,135 4,135 4,135
Table A5.8. Logit Regressions: Largest Obstacle - Corruption (m1adum6)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
 40 
 
coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.141 0.123 0.512 0.517 -0.226* 0.131 -0.068 0.130
Governor's tenure (log) -0.315*** 0.081 -0.186 0.133
Governor: origin X tenure -0.178 0.133
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.700*** 0.194
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile 0.142 0.173
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.268* 0.145
Governor's tenure (months) -0.003 0.004
Governor's tenure squared (months) -0.00001 0.00002
size: less than 20 employees -0.352*** 0.132 -0.353*** 0.132 -0.384*** 0.132 -0.358*** 0.131
size: 20-99 employees -0.043 0.122 -0.047 0.122 -0.064 0.122 -0.036 0.121
age: 1-6 yrs -0.096 0.122 -0.107 0.123 -0.003 0.123 -0.104 0.124
age: 7-9 yrs 0.051 0.126 0.046 0.126 0.121 0.126 0.058 0.126
age: 10-15 yrs -0.091 0.114 -0.095 0.114 -0.054 0.114 -0.088 0.114
exports >5% of sales 1.110*** 0.116 1.106*** 0.117 1.085*** 0.117 1.107*** 0.117
export status unknown or missing -0.283 0.700 -0.279 0.698 -0.287 0.710 -0.304 0.701
foreign actors own more than 10% 0.645*** 0.186 0.651*** 0.186 0.671*** 0.187 0.666*** 0.187
state owns more than 10% -0.352 0.405 -0.365 0.405 -0.329 0.408 -0.377 0.404
ownership status unknown or missing -0.390 0.383 -0.414 0.386 -0.405 0.367 -0.373 0.380
log of GRP for 2010 0.774*** 0.273 0.678** 0.264 0.733*** 0.272 0.840*** 0.276
% self-identifying as Russian 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.004
% construction in GRP value-added 0.055*** 0.017 0.060*** 0.017 0.049*** 0.017 0.046** 0.018
% retail in GRP value-added 0.029 0.018 0.025 0.017 0.027 0.017 0.034* 0.018
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.002 0.010 -0.000 0.010 -0.002 0.010 -0.002 0.010
sector: light manufacturing -0.155 0.131 -0.144 0.131 -0.157 0.132 -0.151 0.133
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.014 0.123 -0.010 0.123 -0.009 0.123 -0.022 0.124
sector: machinery and electronics 0.160 0.152 0.167 0.152 0.145 0.153 0.153 0.154
sector: services -0.136 0.140 -0.135 0.140 -0.142 0.142 -0.145 0.141
sector: construction -0.628*** 0.163 -0.626*** 0.163 -0.647*** 0.165 -0.635*** 0.164
population per sq. km -0.00012* 0.00007* -0.00008* 0.00007* -0.00012* 0.00007* -0.00012* 0.00007*
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.166 0.137 -0.189 0.138 0.010 0.135 -0.174 0.138
/cut1 10.279*** 3.392 9.526*** 3.282 11.538*** 3.267 11.906*** 3.359
/cut2 10.706*** 3.393 9.954*** 3.283 11.965*** 3.269 12.333*** 3.360
/cut3 11.489*** 3.389 10.738*** 3.280 12.749*** 3.265 13.115*** 3.357
/cut4 12.645*** 3.395 11.893*** 3.287 13.904*** 3.271 14.271*** 3.364
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
316 317 327 319
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,389 3,389 3,389 3,389
Table A5.9. Ordered Logit Regressions, customs and trade regulations - obstacle (d30b)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.400*** 0.100 1.450*** 0.493 -0.458*** 0.104 -0.334*** 0.108
Governor's tenure (log) -0.178** 0.070 0.178 0.125
Governor: origin X tenure -0.508*** 0.129
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.569*** 0.171
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile 0.074 0.163
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.394*** 0.134
Governor's tenure (months) 0.002 0.003
Governor's tenure squared (months) -0.00002 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees -0.278** 0.118 -0.283** 0.119 -0.296** 0.117 -0.277** 0.118
size: 20-99 employees -0.031 0.114 -0.041 0.115 -0.042 0.114 -0.028 0.115
age: 1-6 yrs -0.059 0.105 -0.092 0.106 -0.013 0.105 -0.077 0.107
age: 7-9 yrs 0.016 0.107 0.003 0.108 0.052 0.108 0.012 0.107
age: 10-15 yrs -0.064 0.096 -0.077 0.096 -0.045 0.097 -0.072 0.096
exports >5% of sales 0.302** 0.126 0.300** 0.126 0.280** 0.126 0.302** 0.126
export status unknown or missing -1.787 1.095 -1.786 1.099 -1.882* 1.114 -1.821* 1.098
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.185 0.224 -0.178 0.222 -0.189 0.224 -0.172 0.223
state owns more than 10% -0.337 0.389 -0.334 0.399 -0.294 0.389 -0.359 0.385
ownership status unknown or missing -0.413 0.351 -0.460 0.349 -0.393 0.358 -0.391 0.354
log of GRP for 2010 0.590** 0.238 0.250 0.229 0.584** 0.237 0.630*** 0.240
% self-identifying as Russian 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.008** 0.003 0.002 0.003
% construction in GRP value-added 0.095*** 0.015 0.110*** 0.015 0.093*** 0.014 0.085*** 0.017
% retail in GRP value-added -0.015 0.014 -0.029** 0.013 -0.022 0.014 -0.013 0.013
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.003 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.009
sector: light manufacturing -0.098 0.112 -0.089 0.111 -0.104 0.109 -0.095 0.113
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.055 0.109 -0.048 0.107 -0.049 0.109 -0.060 0.109
sector: machinery and electronics -0.380** 0.150 -0.373** 0.149 -0.384** 0.151 -0.384** 0.151
sector: services -0.324*** 0.116 -0.327*** 0.116 -0.327*** 0.115 -0.334*** 0.116
sector: construction 0.091 0.123 0.107 0.122 0.068 0.123 0.086 0.123
population per sq. km -0.00004* 0.00006* 0.00008* 0.00006* -0.00005* 0.00006* -0.00004* 0.00006*
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes 0.118 0.119 0.037 0.121 0.189 0.118 0.079 0.121
/cut1 7.832*** 2.954 4.790* 2.787 8.919*** 2.821 8.730*** 2.870
/cut2 8.169*** 2.952 5.128* 2.785 9.257*** 2.819 9.067*** 2.868
/cut3 8.743*** 2.948 5.705** 2.783 9.835*** 2.815 9.641*** 2.865
/cut4 9.740*** 2.941 6.707** 2.774 10.836*** 2.808 10.640*** 2.857
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.023 0.026 0.026 0.024
179 203 189 186
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,688 3,688 3,688 3,688
Table A5.10. Ordered Logit Regressions, Access to land - obstacle to current operations (g30a)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.206** 0.086 0.159 0.393 -0.310*** 0.094 -0.194** 0.093
Governor's tenure (log) -0.110* 0.057 -0.041 0.097
Governor: origin X tenure -0.098 0.101
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.262* 0.140
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.326*** 0.120
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.027 0.103
Governor's tenure (months) -0.002 0.003
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.000003 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees 0.128 0.106 0.127 0.106 0.118 0.106 0.126 0.106
size: 20-99 employees 0.109 0.104 0.106 0.103 0.096 0.103 0.108 0.104
age: 1-6 yrs -0.144 0.095 -0.150 0.095 -0.029 0.095 -0.137 0.095
age: 7-9 yrs -0.079 0.098 -0.082 0.098 0.006 0.098 -0.072 0.098
age: 10-15 yrs -0.069 0.084 -0.072 0.084 -0.026 0.084 -0.065 0.085
exports >5% of sales 0.237** 0.104 0.236** 0.104 0.227** 0.104 0.238** 0.104
export status unknown or missing -0.140 0.589 -0.139 0.593 -0.134 0.587 -0.141 0.589
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.173 0.196 -0.167 0.195 -0.183 0.198 -0.167 0.196
state owns more than 10% -0.147 0.425 -0.149 0.421 -0.115 0.421 -0.149 0.426
ownership status unknown or missing -0.069 0.331 -0.078 0.331 -0.064 0.351 -0.061 0.332
log of GRP for 2010 0.837*** 0.207 0.776*** 0.202 0.687*** 0.206 0.851*** 0.209
% self-identifying as Russian 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.006** 0.003 0.001 0.003
% construction in GRP value-added 0.010 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.013 0.009 0.015
% retail in GRP value-added -0.029*** 0.011 -0.032*** 0.011 -0.036*** 0.011 -0.028** 0.011
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.020** 0.008 -0.018** 0.008 -0.019** 0.008 -0.020** 0.008
sector: light manufacturing 0.235** 0.103 0.240** 0.103 0.228** 0.101 0.236** 0.103
sector: heavy manufacturing 0.164 0.100 0.167* 0.100 0.169* 0.099 0.162 0.100
sector: machinery and electronics 0.103 0.131 0.107 0.132 0.102 0.133 0.100 0.131
sector: services -0.109 0.094 -0.110 0.094 -0.114 0.094 -0.111 0.094
sector: construction 0.309*** 0.111 0.311*** 0.111 0.288*** 0.111 0.308*** 0.111
population per sq. km -0.00007* 0.00005* -0.00005* 0.00005* -0.00007* 0.00005* -0.00007* 0.00005*
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.266** 0.107 -0.281*** 0.108 -0.070 0.103 -0.248** 0.107
/cut1 9.063*** 2.462 8.522*** 2.389 8.007*** 2.389 9.537*** 2.437
/cut2 9.699*** 2.465 9.158*** 2.392 8.647*** 2.391 10.173*** 2.440
/cut3 10.619*** 2.464 10.078*** 2.392 9.573*** 2.390 11.093*** 2.439
/cut4 11.950*** 2.467 11.409*** 2.395 10.908*** 2.392 12.423*** 2.442
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.009 0.009 0.011 0.008
85 85 107 83
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4,048 4,048 4,048 4,048
Table A5.11. Ordered Logit Regressions, access to finance - an obstacle (k30a)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.406*** 0.102 -0.990** 0.474 -0.427*** 0.107 -0.422*** 0.108
Governor's tenure (log) -0.023 0.067 -0.133 0.113
Governor: origin X tenure 0.158 0.120
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.345** 0.160
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile 0.017 0.139
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.383*** 0.116
Governor's tenure (months) -0.002 0.003
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00001 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees 0.154 0.117 0.152 0.118 0.140 0.117 0.153 0.117
size: 20-99 employees 0.178 0.116 0.178 0.116 0.173 0.116 0.177 0.116
age: 1-6 yrs -0.180 0.110 -0.168 0.109 -0.183* 0.106 -0.180* 0.108
age: 7-9 yrs -0.136 0.115 -0.129 0.115 -0.131 0.114 -0.138 0.114
age: 10-15 yrs -0.098 0.095 -0.093 0.095 -0.089 0.094 -0.098 0.095
exports >5% of sales -0.022 0.122 -0.020 0.122 -0.033 0.121 -0.020 0.122
export status unknown or missing -0.774 0.565 -0.785 0.560 -0.816 0.577 -0.772 0.563
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.204 0.216 -0.212 0.217 -0.210 0.216 -0.208 0.216
state owns more than 10% 0.119 0.366 0.127 0.368 0.161 0.365 0.125 0.367
ownership status unknown or missing -0.106 0.374 -0.096 0.371 -0.098 0.385 -0.109 0.373
log of GRP for 2010 0.464** 0.224 0.570** 0.231 0.430* 0.227 0.456** 0.224
% self-identifying as Russian -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.000 0.003
% construction in GRP value-added 0.003 0.016 -0.001 0.015 0.005 0.015 0.006 0.017
% retail in GRP value-added -0.037*** 0.012 -0.033*** 0.013 -0.041*** 0.012 -0.037*** 0.012
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.004 0.009 -0.006 0.009 -0.002 0.009 -0.003 0.009
sector: light manufacturing 0.115 0.121 0.108 0.121 0.109 0.119 0.111 0.121
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.005 0.118 -0.009 0.118 -0.003 0.118 -0.005 0.118
sector: machinery and electronics -0.180 0.152 -0.182 0.153 -0.175 0.152 -0.181 0.152
sector: services 0.040 0.109 0.040 0.109 0.047 0.109 0.042 0.109
sector: construction 0.223* 0.121 0.219* 0.121 0.211* 0.118 0.224* 0.122
population per sq. km 0.00001* 0.00005* -0.00002* 0.00006* 0.00001* 0.00005* 0.00001* 0.00005*
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.007 0.120 0.020 0.120 -0.049 0.114 0.001 0.120
/cut1 5.123* 2.679 6.098** 2.710 5.185* 2.655 5.100* 2.639
/cut2 5.684** 2.680 6.658** 2.712 5.749** 2.656 5.660** 2.640
/cut3 6.607** 2.674 7.582*** 2.707 6.677** 2.648 6.584** 2.634
/cut4 7.840*** 2.674 8.815*** 2.708 7.913*** 2.648 7.817*** 2.634
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.009 0.009 0.012 0.009
70 71 93 69
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,616 3,616 3,616 3,616
Table A5.12. Ordered Logit Regressions, Practices of informal competitors - obstacle to current operations (e30)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.479*** 0.107 -1.566*** 0.436 -0.597*** 0.114 -0.496*** 0.111
Governor's tenure (log) -0.300*** 0.064 -0.507*** 0.105
Governor: origin X tenure 0.295** 0.117
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.424*** 0.147
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.096 0.132
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile -0.205* 0.123
Governor's tenure (months) -0.010*** 0.003
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00003 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees -0.313*** 0.112 -0.312*** 0.112 -0.313*** 0.112 -0.318*** 0.112
size: 20-99 employees -0.091 0.111 -0.085 0.111 -0.098 0.111 -0.093 0.111
age: 1-6 yrs -0.047 0.107 -0.027 0.107 0.089 0.105 -0.032 0.108
age: 7-9 yrs -0.050 0.104 -0.040 0.104 0.039 0.104 -0.041 0.104
age: 10-15 yrs -0.018 0.095 -0.010 0.095 0.022 0.095 -0.011 0.095
exports >5% of sales 0.141 0.122 0.143 0.122 0.134 0.121 0.148 0.122
export status unknown or missing -0.653 0.660 -0.650 0.663 -0.618 0.673 -0.652 0.657
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.156 0.200 -0.170 0.203 -0.165 0.202 -0.155 0.201
state owns more than 10% -0.658 0.402 -0.643 0.403 -0.641 0.402 -0.652 0.404
ownership status unknown or missing 0.448 0.291 0.478* 0.289 0.441 0.277 0.462 0.291
log of GRP for 2010 0.558** 0.234 0.757*** 0.244 0.483** 0.225 0.563** 0.234
% self-identifying as Russian 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003
% construction in GRP value-added 0.061*** 0.016 0.053*** 0.015 0.056*** 0.015 0.067*** 0.016
% retail in GRP value-added -0.036*** 0.013 -0.029** 0.013 -0.040*** 0.012 -0.033** 0.013
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.004 0.009 -0.008 0.009 -0.006 0.008 -0.003 0.009
sector: light manufacturing -0.193* 0.115 -0.205* 0.114 -0.185 0.114 -0.198* 0.115
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.309*** 0.115 -0.317*** 0.115 -0.296*** 0.113 -0.309*** 0.115
sector: machinery and electronics -0.500*** 0.135 -0.509*** 0.135 -0.504*** 0.135 -0.507*** 0.135
sector: services 0.071 0.110 0.074 0.109 0.071 0.109 0.071 0.109
sector: construction 0.026 0.113 0.024 0.113 0.028 0.114 0.028 0.113
population per sq. km -0.00006* 0.00005* -0.00012* 0.00006* -0.00006* 0.00005* -0.00006* 0.00005*
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.028 0.104 0.016 0.103 0.250** 0.103 0.021 0.105
/cut1 5.651** 2.849 7.482** 2.918 6.215** 2.642 6.563** 2.795
/cut2 6.482** 2.854 8.314*** 2.923 7.046*** 2.646 7.392*** 2.800
/cut3 7.284** 2.853 9.119*** 2.922 7.850*** 2.645 8.195*** 2.799
/cut4 8.490*** 2.842 10.326*** 2.913 9.057*** 2.634 9.400*** 2.788
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.020 0.021 0.021 0.020
134 145 140 137
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4,065 4,065 4,065 4,065
Table A5.13. Ordered Logit Regressions, crime, theft, disorder - an obstacle (i30)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes 0.038 0.080 0.987*** 0.349 -0.018 0.085 0.091 0.084
Governor's tenure (log) 0.110** 0.050 0.289*** 0.079
Governor: origin X tenure -0.256*** 0.092
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.022 0.121
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.387*** 0.126
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.114 0.097
Governor's tenure (months) 0.009*** 0.002
Governor's tenure squared (months) -0.00003 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees -0.053 0.094 -0.056 0.094 -0.062 0.094 -0.047 0.094
size: 20-99 employees 0.093 0.093 0.087 0.093 0.087 0.093 0.098 0.093
age: 1-6 yrs -0.122 0.092 -0.137 0.092 -0.101 0.092 -0.120 0.093
age: 7-9 yrs -0.008 0.094 -0.016 0.094 0.015 0.095 -0.000 0.094
age: 10-15 yrs 0.030 0.088 0.022 0.087 0.043 0.088 0.030 0.088
exports >5% of sales -0.068 0.113 -0.072 0.113 -0.089 0.113 -0.076 0.113
export status unknown or missing -1.329*** 0.515 -1.313** 0.523 -1.310** 0.530 -1.337** 0.534
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.648*** 0.155 -0.639*** 0.155 -0.663*** 0.155 -0.641*** 0.154
state owns more than 10% -0.077 0.262 -0.090 0.264 -0.055 0.261 -0.095 0.266
ownership status unknown or missing -0.172 0.333 -0.193 0.339 -0.169 0.336 -0.163 0.338
log of GRP for 2010 0.305 0.187 0.138 0.203 0.146 0.187 0.340* 0.188
% self-identifying as Russian -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.004 0.003
% construction in GRP value-added 0.009 0.012 0.015 0.012 0.014 0.011 -0.002 0.013
% retail in GRP value-added 0.004 0.012 -0.002 0.012 -0.004 0.012 0.003 0.011
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.009 0.007 -0.006 0.007 -0.006 0.007 -0.010 0.007
sector: light manufacturing 0.288*** 0.104 0.301*** 0.105 0.288*** 0.103 0.298*** 0.104
sector: heavy manufacturing 0.153 0.097 0.163* 0.097 0.155 0.097 0.154 0.096
sector: machinery and electronics 0.149 0.117 0.158 0.118 0.154 0.117 0.154 0.117
sector: services 0.103 0.087 0.099 0.087 0.099 0.086 0.094 0.087
sector: construction 0.129 0.109 0.132 0.109 0.109 0.106 0.122 0.108
population per sq. km -0.00002* 0.00004* 0.00004* 0.00004* -0.00001* 0.00004* -0.00002* 0.00004*
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes 0.033 0.102 -0.005 0.103 0.045 0.102 0.018 0.105
/cut1 2.245 2.245 0.726 2.384 0.106 2.183 2.317 2.212
/cut2 2.827 2.243 1.308 2.382 0.690 2.181 2.900 2.210
/cut3 3.891* 2.244 2.373 2.383 1.760 2.182 3.965* 2.210
/cut4 5.294** 2.249 3.778 2.388 3.170 2.187 5.372** 2.215
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.006 0.007 0.009 0.008
78 90 98 92
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4,136 4,136 4,136 4,136
Table A5.14. Ordered Logit Regressions, tax rates - an obstacle (j30a)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.302*** 0.104 -1.156*** 0.434 -0.475*** 0.106 -0.287*** 0.109
Governor's tenure (log) -0.170*** 0.061 -0.333*** 0.109
Governor: origin X tenure 0.231** 0.110
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.337** 0.140
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.458*** 0.127
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile -0.274** 0.109
Governor's tenure (months) -0.003 0.003
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.000004 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees -0.235** 0.108 -0.232** 0.108 -0.240** 0.107 -0.240** 0.107
size: 20-99 employees -0.036 0.106 -0.029 0.107 -0.052 0.107 -0.039 0.106
age: 1-6 yrs 0.042 0.097 0.056 0.097 0.197** 0.094 0.066 0.097
age: 7-9 yrs 0.033 0.095 0.039 0.095 0.136 0.096 0.052 0.095
age: 10-15 yrs 0.060 0.088 0.067 0.088 0.117 0.087 0.069 0.089
exports >5% of sales 0.248** 0.109 0.249** 0.109 0.232** 0.109 0.249** 0.109
export status unknown or missing 0.443 0.445 0.437 0.440 0.529 0.464 0.441 0.450
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.100 0.175 -0.109 0.177 -0.114 0.180 -0.091 0.175
state owns more than 10% 0.133 0.349 0.141 0.351 0.173 0.370 0.130 0.350
ownership status unknown or missing -0.094 0.395 -0.073 0.389 -0.080 0.394 -0.080 0.395
log of GRP for 2010 -0.346 0.224 -0.205 0.217 -0.579*** 0.210 -0.316 0.226
% self-identifying as Russian 0.009*** 0.003 0.010*** 0.003 0.015*** 0.003 0.008** 0.003
% construction in GRP value-added 0.015 0.015 0.009 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.016
% retail in GRP value-added -0.022* 0.012 -0.017 0.013 -0.033*** 0.012 -0.019 0.012
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.013 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.012* 0.007 0.012 0.008
sector: light manufacturing -0.107 0.110 -0.115 0.110 -0.103 0.110 -0.107 0.111
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.089 0.105 -0.097 0.104 -0.076 0.105 -0.091 0.105
sector: machinery and electronics -0.022 0.131 -0.030 0.131 -0.022 0.132 -0.031 0.131
sector: services -0.248** 0.100 -0.246** 0.099 -0.252** 0.100 -0.251** 0.100
sector: construction 0.024 0.117 0.021 0.116 0.020 0.116 0.021 0.117
population per sq. km 0.00008* 0.00005* 0.00004* 0.00005* 0.00010* 0.00004* 0.00008* 0.00005*
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.085 0.103 -0.051 0.102 0.184* 0.101 -0.025 0.103
/cut1 -4.604* 2.708 -3.367 2.618 -6.422*** 2.473 -3.747 2.671
/cut2 -3.854 2.710 -2.616 2.621 -5.666** 2.476 -2.998 2.673
/cut3 -2.766 2.711 -1.527 2.620 -4.567* 2.477 -1.912 2.675
/cut4 -1.592 2.701 -0.351 2.612 -3.383 2.470 -0.738 2.666
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.007 0.007 0.012 0.006
48 50 88 46
0.003 0.002 0.000 0.006
4,140 4,140 4,140 4,140
Table A5.15. Ordered Logit Regressions, tax admininstration - an obstacle (j30b)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.323*** 0.107 -1.309*** 0.459 -0.458*** 0.111 -0.337*** 0.116
Governor's tenure (log) -0.322*** 0.067 -0.514*** 0.114
Governor: origin X tenure 0.269** 0.119
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.862*** 0.157
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.0002 0.147
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.277** 0.114
Governor's tenure (months) -0.011*** 0.003
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00003 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees -0.225* 0.123 -0.222* 0.123 -0.254** 0.123 -0.235* 0.123
size: 20-99 employees 0.102 0.120 0.108 0.120 0.080 0.121 0.097 0.120
age: 1-6 yrs -0.464*** 0.115 -0.446*** 0.115 -0.353*** 0.115 -0.443*** 0.115
age: 7-9 yrs -0.292** 0.121 -0.285** 0.122 -0.212* 0.121 -0.276** 0.121
age: 10-15 yrs -0.256** 0.106 -0.250** 0.106 -0.214** 0.106 -0.246** 0.106
exports >5% of sales 0.256** 0.129 0.260** 0.129 0.224* 0.131 0.264** 0.129
export status unknown or missing -0.247 0.813 -0.258 0.815 -0.307 0.795 -0.241 0.808
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.017 0.209 -0.030 0.210 -0.017 0.211 -0.017 0.209
state owns more than 10% -0.377 0.402 -0.374 0.407 -0.359 0.402 -0.369 0.404
ownership status unknown or missing -0.106 0.343 -0.074 0.347 -0.139 0.337 -0.090 0.342
log of GRP for 2010 0.539** 0.245 0.715*** 0.239 0.472** 0.238 0.543** 0.248
% self-identifying as Russian 0.008** 0.004 0.009** 0.004 0.014*** 0.004 0.008** 0.004
% construction in GRP value-added 0.073*** 0.015 0.065*** 0.015 0.070*** 0.014 0.078*** 0.017
% retail in GRP value-added -0.068*** 0.013 -0.061*** 0.013 -0.077*** 0.013 -0.064*** 0.013
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.005 0.009 -0.008 0.009 -0.005 0.009 -0.004 0.009
sector: light manufacturing -0.214* 0.125 -0.223* 0.125 -0.206* 0.122 -0.221* 0.125
sector: heavy manufacturing 0.168 0.117 0.163 0.116 0.180 0.117 0.166 0.117
sector: machinery and electronics 0.475*** 0.135 0.472*** 0.134 0.486*** 0.137 0.462*** 0.135
sector: services 0.139 0.116 0.144 0.116 0.140 0.118 0.139 0.116
sector: construction 0.611*** 0.138 0.615*** 0.138 0.588*** 0.135 0.612*** 0.137
population per sq. km 0.00003* 0.00005* -0.00003* 0.00005* 0.00003* 0.00005* 0.00004* 0.00005*
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.204* 0.118 -0.162 0.117 -0.021 0.116 -0.136 0.120
/cut1 5.858** 2.953 7.435*** 2.852 6.983** 2.808 6.817** 2.929
/cut2 6.320** 2.955 7.897*** 2.853 7.448*** 2.809 7.277** 2.931
/cut3 6.980** 2.954 8.559*** 2.853 8.115*** 2.809 7.938*** 2.930
/cut4 8.095*** 2.954 9.674*** 2.856 9.232*** 2.810 9.052*** 2.931
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.032 0.033 0.036 0.031
231 239 238 226
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,773 3,773 3,773 3,773
Table A5.16. Ordered Logit Regressions, business licensing and permits - an obstacle (j30c)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.205** 0.090 0.301 0.400 -0.305*** 0.095 -0.184* 0.094
Governor's tenure (log) -0.080 0.057 0.016 0.100
Governor: origin X tenure -0.137 0.103
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.246* 0.139
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.330** 0.130
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.032 0.112
Governor's tenure (months) 0.000 0.003
Governor's tenure squared (months) -0.000004 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees -0.072 0.103 -0.076 0.103 -0.086 0.102 -0.075 0.103
size: 20-99 employees 0.079 0.102 0.075 0.102 0.059 0.102 0.078 0.102
age: 1-6 yrs -0.275*** 0.095 -0.284*** 0.095 -0.181* 0.095 -0.268*** 0.096
age: 7-9 yrs -0.136 0.094 -0.141 0.094 -0.075 0.093 -0.129 0.094
age: 10-15 yrs -0.131 0.088 -0.136 0.088 -0.098 0.087 -0.129 0.088
exports >5% of sales 0.307*** 0.108 0.304*** 0.108 0.291*** 0.108 0.307*** 0.108
export status unknown or missing -0.815* 0.480 -0.800* 0.485 -0.794 0.496 -0.815* 0.484
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.249 0.195 -0.241 0.193 -0.273 0.194 -0.242 0.194
state owns more than 10% -0.920*** 0.297 -0.922*** 0.297 -0.895*** 0.306 -0.927*** 0.299
ownership status unknown or missing -0.247 0.409 -0.256 0.409 -0.249 0.409 -0.239 0.409
log of GRP for 2010 0.532** 0.211 0.445** 0.212 0.371* 0.209 0.552*** 0.212
% self-identifying as Russian 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.006** 0.003 0.000 0.003
% construction in GRP value-added 0.026* 0.015 0.029** 0.015 0.026* 0.014 0.021 0.015
% retail in GRP value-added 0.006 0.011 0.002 0.011 -0.001 0.011 0.007 0.011
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.014* 0.008 -0.012 0.008 -0.012 0.008 -0.014* 0.008
sector: light manufacturing 0.003 0.110 0.009 0.110 0.003 0.108 0.004 0.110
sector: heavy manufacturing 0.086 0.102 0.092 0.103 0.096 0.102 0.085 0.102
sector: machinery and electronics 0.090 0.114 0.095 0.114 0.089 0.112 0.087 0.114
sector: services -0.043 0.092 -0.043 0.092 -0.045 0.092 -0.047 0.092
sector: construction 0.350*** 0.104 0.353*** 0.104 0.332*** 0.103 0.348*** 0.104
population per sq. km -0.00003* 0.00004* 0.00000* 0.00004* -0.00002* 0.00004* -0.00003* 0.00004*
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.218** 0.106 -0.241** 0.107 -0.059 0.109 -0.201* 0.109
/cut1 5.943** 2.482 5.159** 2.481 4.646* 2.394 6.403*** 2.454
/cut2 6.473*** 2.484 5.689** 2.483 5.179** 2.395 6.933*** 2.456
/cut3 7.203*** 2.486 6.420*** 2.485 5.915** 2.397 7.663*** 2.458
/cut4 8.405*** 2.484 7.622*** 2.483 7.122*** 2.396 8.864*** 2.456
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.011 0.011 0.014 0.011
101 104 123 100
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,936 3,936 3,936 3,936
Table A5.17. Ordered Logit Regressions, corruption - an obstacle (j30f)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.405*** 0.132 -1.935*** 0.537 -0.535*** 0.145 -0.379*** 0.145
Governor's tenure (log) -0.150* 0.080 -0.447*** 0.135
Governor: origin X tenure 0.419*** 0.139
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.268 0.186
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.468*** 0.159
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile -0.068 0.140
Governor's tenure (months) -0.001 0.004
Governor's tenure squared (months) -0.000003 0.00002
size: less than 20 employees -0.733*** 0.126 -0.732*** 0.126 -0.751*** 0.126 -0.736*** 0.126
size: 20-99 employees -0.291*** 0.112 -0.284** 0.112 -0.312*** 0.112 -0.290*** 0.111
age: 1-6 yrs -0.381*** 0.119 -0.348*** 0.119 -0.225* 0.120 -0.374*** 0.119
age: 7-9 yrs -0.224* 0.121 -0.210* 0.121 -0.117 0.120 -0.214* 0.120
age: 10-15 yrs -0.062 0.107 -0.049 0.108 0.004 0.107 -0.058 0.107
exports >5% of sales 0.252* 0.134 0.255* 0.134 0.228* 0.133 0.252* 0.134
export status unknown or missing -0.637 0.815 -0.643 0.828 -0.634 0.834 -0.650 0.817
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.313 0.242 -0.331 0.242 -0.339 0.246 -0.304 0.242
state owns more than 10% 0.154 0.389 0.174 0.399 0.174 0.392 0.146 0.390
ownership status unknown or missing -0.310 0.396 -0.264 0.389 -0.286 0.396 -0.301 0.396
log of GRP for 2010 -0.488* 0.294 -0.241 0.281 -0.665** 0.294 -0.455 0.297
% self-identifying as Russian 0.006* 0.004 0.007* 0.004 0.011*** 0.004 0.005 0.004
% construction in GRP value-added 0.085*** 0.021 0.074*** 0.019 0.080*** 0.019 0.080*** 0.022
% retail in GRP value-added -0.024* 0.014 -0.015 0.015 -0.032** 0.014 -0.022 0.014
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.024** 0.011 0.019* 0.011 0.024** 0.010 0.023** 0.012
sector: light manufacturing 0.086 0.142 0.077 0.142 0.099 0.139 0.088 0.142
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.105 0.139 -0.122 0.140 -0.089 0.138 -0.105 0.139
sector: machinery and electronics -0.083 0.163 -0.100 0.163 -0.092 0.164 -0.088 0.163
sector: services 0.070 0.130 0.073 0.130 0.067 0.129 0.065 0.130
sector: construction 0.037 0.146 0.033 0.145 0.014 0.144 0.035 0.145
population per sq. km 0.00010* 0.00006* 0.00001* 0.00006* 0.00011* 0.00006* 0.00009* 0.00006*
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.037 0.135 0.039 0.137 0.244* 0.131 -0.019 0.130
/cut1 -5.388 3.531 -3.229 3.388 -6.620* 3.395 -4.593 3.443
/cut2 -4.761 3.535 -2.599 3.391 -5.989* 3.399 -3.966 3.449
/cut3 -3.952 3.544 -1.787 3.398 -5.174 3.406 -3.158 3.458
/cut4 -2.564 3.532 -0.397 3.388 -3.781 3.393 -1.771 3.446
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.023 0.025 0.027 0.023
146 158 171 148
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,923 3,923 3,923 3,923
Table A5.18. Ordered Logit Regressions, courts - an obstacle (h30)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.942*** 0.094 -0.967** 0.418 -1.058*** 0.092 -0.956*** 0.098
Governor's tenure (log) -0.206*** 0.057 -0.211** 0.098
Governor: origin X tenure 0.007 0.111
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.736*** 0.133
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile 0.049 0.135
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.172 0.115
Governor's tenure (months) -0.006** 0.003
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00002 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees -0.201* 0.109 -0.201* 0.109 -0.216** 0.109 -0.206* 0.109
size: 20-99 employees 0.036 0.107 0.036 0.107 0.022 0.107 0.033 0.107
age: 1-6 yrs -0.056 0.102 -0.055 0.103 -0.007 0.102 -0.027 0.104
age: 7-9 yrs 0.009 0.098 0.009 0.098 0.044 0.097 0.029 0.098
age: 10-15 yrs -0.031 0.090 -0.031 0.090 -0.016 0.091 -0.019 0.090
exports >5% of sales 0.304*** 0.109 0.304*** 0.109 0.282*** 0.108 0.312*** 0.109
export status unknown or missing 0.159 0.471 0.159 0.471 0.142 0.464 0.161 0.468
foreign actors own more than 10% 0.173 0.212 0.172 0.211 0.167 0.212 0.175 0.212
state owns more than 10% -0.517 0.360 -0.517 0.360 -0.491 0.351 -0.505 0.363
ownership status unknown or missing -0.154 0.449 -0.154 0.449 -0.140 0.451 -0.143 0.452
log of GRP for 2010 0.431** 0.194 0.436** 0.212 0.302 0.184 0.443** 0.194
% self-identifying as Russian 0.007*** 0.003 0.007*** 0.003 0.013*** 0.003 0.007** 0.003
% construction in GRP value-added 0.069*** 0.013 0.069*** 0.014 0.072*** 0.013 0.071*** 0.014
% retail in GRP value-added -0.018 0.012 -0.017 0.012 -0.027** 0.012 -0.015 0.011
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.001 0.008 -0.001 0.008 0.000 0.007 -0.000 0.008
sector: light manufacturing -0.098 0.109 -0.098 0.109 -0.094 0.108 -0.101 0.109
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.023 0.113 -0.024 0.113 -0.012 0.112 -0.023 0.113
sector: machinery and electronics 0.022 0.130 0.022 0.130 0.033 0.129 0.009 0.129
sector: services -0.168 0.103 -0.168 0.103 -0.168* 0.102 -0.169* 0.102
sector: construction 0.342*** 0.124 0.342*** 0.124 0.326*** 0.122 0.343*** 0.124
population per sq. km -0.00005* 0.00005* -0.00006* 0.00005* -0.00005* 0.00005* -0.00005* 0.00004*
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.078 0.107 -0.077 0.106 -0.026 0.106 0.003 0.109
/cut1 4.428* 2.398 4.469* 2.548 4.237* 2.258 5.197** 2.346
/cut2 5.134** 2.398 5.175** 2.548 4.947** 2.258 5.902** 2.347
/cut3 6.234*** 2.397 6.275** 2.547 6.058*** 2.254 7.002*** 2.346
/cut4 7.469*** 2.394 7.510*** 2.546 7.301*** 2.253 8.236*** 2.343
/cut5 8.151*** 2.399 8.192*** 2.550 7.984*** 2.257 8.918*** 2.348
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.025 0.025 0.028 0.024
204 204 244 201
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,812 3,812 3,812 3,812
Table A5.19. Ordered Logit Regressions, frequency of bribes, 1-6 (ECAq39)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.737*** 0.131 -1.501** 0.732 -0.887*** 0.128 -0.746*** 0.140
Governor's tenure (log) -0.297*** 0.085 -0.446*** 0.166
Governor: origin X tenure 0.211 0.202
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.823*** 0.209
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile 0.071 0.208
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile -0.009 0.215
Governor's tenure (months) -0.007* 0.004
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00002 0.00002
size: less than 20 employees -0.115 0.147 -0.113 0.147 -0.125 0.147 -0.125 0.146
size: 20-99 employees -0.074 0.143 -0.072 0.143 -0.088 0.142 -0.077 0.143
age: 1-6 yrs -0.002 0.145 0.010 0.145 0.081 0.141 0.056 0.146
age: 7-9 yrs 0.010 0.135 0.018 0.135 0.057 0.133 0.057 0.135
age: 10-15 yrs -0.029 0.123 -0.022 0.124 -0.007 0.122 -0.004 0.123
exports >5% of sales 0.886*** 0.129 0.891*** 0.129 0.868*** 0.129 0.889*** 0.129
export status unknown or missing -0.198 0.779 -0.209 0.780 -0.130 0.759 -0.163 0.770
foreign actors own more than 10% 0.298 0.260 0.292 0.260 0.279 0.258 0.311 0.259
state owns more than 10% -0.513 0.536 -0.511 0.532 -0.471 0.523 -0.505 0.537
ownership status unknown or missing -1.191* 0.715 -1.167 0.712 -1.160 0.725 -1.174 0.714
log of GRP for 2010 -0.454 0.281 -0.332 0.310 -0.608** 0.271 -0.419 0.281
% self-identifying as Russian 0.029*** 0.005 0.030*** 0.005 0.035*** 0.005 0.028*** 0.005
% construction in GRP value-added 0.071*** 0.020 0.064*** 0.021 0.073*** 0.020 0.069*** 0.022
% retail in GRP value-added -0.036* 0.019 -0.031 0.020 -0.047** 0.019 -0.032* 0.019
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.001 0.013 -0.001 0.013 0.002 0.012 0.001 0.013
sector: light manufacturing -0.048 0.157 -0.053 0.158 -0.027 0.156 -0.048 0.157
sector: heavy manufacturing 0.027 0.152 0.026 0.152 0.056 0.153 0.024 0.153
sector: machinery and electronics 0.085 0.184 0.076 0.186 0.096 0.182 0.067 0.184
sector: services -0.393** 0.157 -0.393** 0.158 -0.390** 0.156 -0.396** 0.157
sector: construction 0.194 0.174 0.186 0.174 0.187 0.177 0.194 0.174
population per sq. km 0.00004* 0.00007* -0.00001* 0.00008* 0.00005* 0.00007* 0.00003* 0.00007*
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.027 0.146 -0.002 0.147 0.083 0.148 0.119 0.147
/cut1 -3.496 3.412 -2.445 3.643 -3.665 3.238 -2.147 3.299
/cut2 -2.920 3.408 -1.869 3.639 -3.086 3.233 -1.573 3.296
/cut3 -1.977 3.402 -0.924 3.635 -2.132 3.223 -0.632 3.290
/cut4 -0.710 3.390 0.344 3.631 -0.855 3.214 0.632 3.278
/cut5 -0.005 3.377 1.048 3.620 -0.150 3.203 1.337 3.265
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.042 0.043 0.046 0.040
184 191 231 178
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,472 3,472 3,472 3,472
Table A5.20. Ordered Logit Regressions, frequency of bribes to customs/imports (ECAq41a)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.939*** 0.122 -2.762*** 0.653 -1.078*** 0.118 -0.967*** 0.131
Governor's tenure (log) -0.313*** 0.077 -0.669*** 0.154
Governor: origin X tenure 0.504*** 0.184
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.974*** 0.198
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile 0.243 0.191
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.133 0.201
Governor's tenure (months) -0.010*** 0.004
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00003 0.00002
size: less than 20 employees -0.199 0.137 -0.195 0.137 -0.205 0.138 -0.205 0.137
size: 20-99 employees -0.144 0.137 -0.138 0.137 -0.148 0.137 -0.147 0.137
age: 1-6 yrs -0.059 0.129 -0.023 0.129 -0.015 0.130 -0.007 0.131
age: 7-9 yrs 0.086 0.127 0.105 0.127 0.106 0.126 0.122 0.127
age: 10-15 yrs 0.011 0.119 0.031 0.121 0.022 0.120 0.032 0.119
exports >5% of sales 0.431*** 0.144 0.440*** 0.143 0.410*** 0.145 0.436*** 0.144
export status unknown or missing 0.168 0.782 0.154 0.781 0.186 0.760 0.205 0.774
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.292 0.271 -0.317 0.271 -0.336 0.277 -0.277 0.270
state owns more than 10% -0.310 0.485 -0.280 0.473 -0.273 0.478 -0.298 0.483
ownership status unknown or missing -0.343 0.553 -0.289 0.554 -0.326 0.571 -0.323 0.555
log of GRP for 2010 -0.678*** 0.231 -0.404 0.257 -0.797*** 0.228 -0.654*** 0.232
% self-identifying as Russian 0.017*** 0.004 0.019*** 0.003 0.023*** 0.004 0.016*** 0.004
% construction in GRP value-added 0.078*** 0.019 0.064*** 0.020 0.081*** 0.019 0.081*** 0.020
% retail in GRP value-added -0.026 0.017 -0.013 0.017 -0.037** 0.017 -0.022 0.016
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.017 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.018* 0.010 0.018 0.011
sector: light manufacturing 0.079 0.138 0.070 0.138 0.093 0.136 0.075 0.138
sector: heavy manufacturing 0.037 0.145 0.029 0.146 0.064 0.146 0.037 0.146
sector: machinery and electronics 0.065 0.179 0.047 0.179 0.087 0.177 0.046 0.178
sector: services -0.140 0.144 -0.138 0.144 -0.138 0.143 -0.143 0.144
sector: construction 0.185 0.158 0.171 0.157 0.176 0.156 0.185 0.158
population per sq. km -0.00002* 0.00006* -0.00012* 0.00007* -0.00001* 0.00006* -0.00002* 0.00006*
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.207 0.130 -0.135 0.132 -0.168 0.137 -0.061 0.136
/cut1 -7.585*** 2.853 -5.162* 3.039 -7.153*** 2.767 -6.314** 2.780
/cut2 -6.895** 2.848 -4.468 3.035 -6.458** 2.762 -5.625** 2.776
/cut3 -5.884** 2.848 -3.453 3.038 -5.435** 2.756 -4.617* 2.775
/cut4 -4.313 2.829 -1.877 3.023 -3.852 2.742 -3.047 2.758
/cut5 -3.428 2.846 -0.993 3.038 -2.968 2.756 -2.162 2.775
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.031 0.034 0.036 0.030
128 154 162 123
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,552 3,552 3,552 3,552
Table A5.21. Ordered Logit Regressions, frequency of bribes to courts (ECAq41b)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.931*** 0.113 -2.680*** 0.492 -1.075*** 0.110 -0.970*** 0.122
Governor's tenure (log) -0.152** 0.069 -0.467*** 0.110
Governor: origin X tenure 0.474*** 0.128
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.580*** 0.169
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.158 0.163
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile -0.098 0.159
Governor's tenure (months) -0.005* 0.003
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00002 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees -0.144 0.124 -0.134 0.125 -0.147 0.124 -0.148 0.124
size: 20-99 employees -0.037 0.123 -0.023 0.124 -0.047 0.123 -0.041 0.123
age: 1-6 yrs 0.032 0.119 0.063 0.119 0.096 0.118 0.094 0.119
age: 7-9 yrs 0.023 0.119 0.036 0.119 0.052 0.118 0.064 0.119
age: 10-15 yrs 0.035 0.104 0.047 0.105 0.055 0.104 0.058 0.104
exports >5% of sales 0.266** 0.128 0.273** 0.127 0.244* 0.127 0.269** 0.128
export status unknown or missing 0.280 0.679 0.266 0.684 0.353 0.664 0.320 0.671
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.259 0.267 -0.282 0.268 -0.302 0.275 -0.255 0.266
state owns more than 10% 0.098 0.343 0.111 0.338 0.142 0.329 0.115 0.343
ownership status unknown or missing -0.594 0.585 -0.546 0.589 -0.568 0.583 -0.580 0.586
log of GRP for 2010 -0.603*** 0.231 -0.297 0.244 -0.804*** 0.222 -0.598*** 0.231
% self-identifying as Russian 0.014*** 0.003 0.016*** 0.003 0.021*** 0.003 0.014*** 0.003
% construction in GRP value-added 0.063*** 0.018 0.048*** 0.018 0.066*** 0.017 0.064*** 0.019
% retail in GRP value-added 0.003 0.014 0.015 0.015 -0.010 0.015 0.006 0.014
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.008 0.010 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.010
sector: light manufacturing -0.166 0.132 -0.171 0.132 -0.151 0.130 -0.166 0.132
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.082 0.122 -0.087 0.122 -0.057 0.123 -0.080 0.122
sector: machinery and electronics -0.165 0.156 -0.175 0.156 -0.141 0.155 -0.177 0.156
sector: services -0.195 0.125 -0.187 0.125 -0.193 0.125 -0.194 0.125
sector: construction 0.102 0.137 0.095 0.136 0.095 0.136 0.105 0.137
population per sq. km 0.00001* 0.00005* -0.00009* 0.00005* 0.00003* 0.00005* 0.00001* 0.00004*
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.047 0.119 0.027 0.118 0.029 0.123 0.102 0.119
/cut1 -6.229** 2.740 -3.333 2.837 -7.624*** 2.626 -5.586** 2.693
/cut2 -5.502** 2.739 -2.603 2.837 -6.893*** 2.626 -4.859* 2.693
/cut3 -4.323 2.739 -1.417 2.835 -5.697** 2.619 -3.680 2.692
/cut4 -2.857 2.703 0.054 2.810 -4.215 2.589 -2.215 2.656
/cut5 -1.987 2.704 0.923 2.808 -3.345 2.588 -1.345 2.657
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.028 0.030 0.032 0.027
140 152 181 142
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,716 3,716 3,716 3,716
Table A5.22. Ordered Logit Regressions, frequency of bribes to tax collection (ECAq41c)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -1.049*** 0.148 -3.678*** 0.765 -1.096*** 0.137 -1.093*** 0.155
Governor's tenure (log) -0.193** 0.093 -0.705*** 0.176
Governor: origin X tenure 0.729*** 0.214
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 1.109*** 0.245
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile 0.496** 0.241
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.386* 0.220
Governor's tenure (months) -0.007 0.004
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00003 0.00002
size: less than 20 employees -0.063 0.155 -0.060 0.155 -0.071 0.155 -0.070 0.156
size: 20-99 employees -0.138 0.150 -0.128 0.150 -0.127 0.149 -0.144 0.151
age: 1-6 yrs -0.038 0.144 0.012 0.145 -0.115 0.146 0.026 0.148
age: 7-9 yrs -0.022 0.144 0.009 0.145 -0.085 0.143 0.022 0.145
age: 10-15 yrs 0.031 0.128 0.036 0.129 -0.008 0.129 0.057 0.129
exports >5% of sales 0.027 0.164 0.030 0.165 0.003 0.162 0.032 0.165
export status unknown or missing 0.040 0.702 -0.081 0.667 -0.052 0.708 0.059 0.678
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.552* 0.314 -0.559* 0.318 -0.591* 0.310 -0.547* 0.317
state owns more than 10% 0.506 0.461 0.556 0.447 0.535 0.451 0.528 0.468
ownership status unknown or missing -0.330 0.747 -0.351 0.760 -0.327 0.708 -0.330 0.755
log of GRP for 2010 -0.216 0.274 0.152 0.307 -0.249 0.270 -0.205 0.274
% self-identifying as Russian 0.028*** 0.005 0.028*** 0.005 0.034*** 0.006 0.027*** 0.006
% construction in GRP value-added 0.136*** 0.021 0.113*** 0.022 0.142*** 0.020 0.139*** 0.022
% retail in GRP value-added 0.005 0.024 0.020 0.025 -0.013 0.024 0.009 0.023
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.016 0.013 0.008 0.012 0.015 0.013 0.016 0.013
sector: light manufacturing -0.066 0.170 -0.090 0.171 -0.074 0.167 -0.065 0.171
sector: heavy manufacturing 0.077 0.160 0.066 0.159 0.082 0.157 0.080 0.160
sector: machinery and electronics 0.234 0.198 0.214 0.200 0.265 0.195 0.221 0.199
sector: services -0.153 0.159 -0.153 0.157 -0.143 0.159 -0.152 0.158
sector: construction 0.378** 0.180 0.360** 0.178 0.384** 0.178 0.379** 0.180
population per sq. km -0.00011 0.00008 -0.00026 0.00009 -0.00009 0.00008 -0.00011 0.00008
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.120 0.138 -0.019 0.139 -0.317** 0.143 0.025 0.139
/cut1 0.669 3.470 3.612 3.711 1.610 3.304 1.486 3.346
/cut2 1.243 3.467 4.193 3.708 2.193 3.299 2.059 3.344
/cut3 2.413 3.437 5.373 3.681 3.380 3.276 3.229 3.316
/cut4 4.442 3.439 7.402** 3.682 5.412* 3.278 5.257 3.318
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.050 0.055 0.057 0.049
192 222 253 191
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,210 3,210 3,210 3,210
Table A5.23. Ordered Logit Regressions, bribes to parliamentarians - direct impact (ECAq44a)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.984*** 0.142 -3.374*** 0.722 -1.051*** 0.134 -1.026*** 0.151
Governor's tenure (log) -0.245*** 0.088 -0.718*** 0.171
Governor: origin X tenure 0.665*** 0.205
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 1.089*** 0.223
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile 0.521** 0.218
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.255 0.204
Governor's tenure (months) -0.008** 0.004
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00003 0.00002
size: less than 20 employees -0.131 0.151 -0.125 0.151 -0.135 0.151 -0.137 0.152
size: 20-99 employees -0.081 0.144 -0.065 0.145 -0.073 0.144 -0.085 0.145
age: 1-6 yrs 0.014 0.141 0.057 0.142 -0.045 0.142 0.076 0.145
age: 7-9 yrs 0.014 0.141 0.043 0.141 -0.039 0.141 0.057 0.142
age: 10-15 yrs 0.102 0.125 0.110 0.125 0.066 0.126 0.127 0.125
exports >5% of sales 0.093 0.157 0.095 0.158 0.073 0.157 0.099 0.158
export status unknown or missing 0.138 0.778 0.081 0.751 0.091 0.787 0.159 0.755
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.607** 0.300 -0.605** 0.306 -0.631** 0.303 -0.602** 0.301
state owns more than 10% 0.499 0.478 0.537 0.467 0.516 0.470 0.521 0.485
ownership status unknown or missing 0.373 0.491 0.383 0.505 0.366 0.486 0.379 0.497
log of GRP for 2010 -0.123 0.262 0.223 0.299 -0.130 0.257 -0.112 0.262
% self-identifying as Russian 0.027*** 0.005 0.028*** 0.004 0.032*** 0.005 0.027*** 0.005
% construction in GRP value-added 0.126*** 0.019 0.105*** 0.020 0.131*** 0.018 0.130*** 0.021
% retail in GRP value-added 0.004 0.023 0.019 0.025 -0.009 0.023 0.008 0.023
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.014 0.013 0.007 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013
sector: light manufacturing -0.112 0.160 -0.139 0.160 -0.114 0.157 -0.113 0.161
sector: heavy manufacturing 0.006 0.154 -0.008 0.154 0.017 0.152 0.007 0.155
sector: machinery and electronics 0.182 0.193 0.163 0.195 0.205 0.192 0.166 0.193
sector: services -0.174 0.150 -0.175 0.149 -0.161 0.150 -0.176 0.150
sector: construction 0.398** 0.178 0.381** 0.176 0.407** 0.176 0.399** 0.178
population per sq. km -0.00014 0.00007 -0.00029 0.00009 -0.00014 0.00008 -0.00015 0.00007
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.159 0.142 -0.069 0.143 -0.325** 0.141 -0.009 0.142
/cut1 1.430 3.342 4.228 3.645 2.865 3.168 2.388 3.216
/cut2 1.989 3.337 4.794 3.640 3.433 3.163 2.946 3.213
/cut3 3.068 3.325 5.882 3.633 4.522 3.157 4.025 3.203
/cut4 5.323 3.315 8.137** 3.622 6.779** 3.148 6.280** 3.193
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.047 0.051 0.053 0.046
211 241 273 203
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,183 3,183 3,183 3,183
Table A5.24. Ordered Logit Regressions, bribes to gov officials - direct impact (ECAq44b)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.857*** 0.130 -2.585*** 0.651 -0.905*** 0.126 -0.882*** 0.137
Governor's tenure (log) -0.237*** 0.075 -0.562*** 0.141
Governor: origin X tenure 0.475*** 0.182
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 1.013*** 0.194
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile 0.586*** 0.204
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.365** 0.175
Governor's tenure (months) -0.008** 0.004
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00003 0.00002
size: less than 20 employees 0.000 0.148 0.004 0.148 -0.004 0.148 -0.004 0.149
size: 20-99 employees 0.066 0.144 0.074 0.144 0.077 0.144 0.063 0.145
age: 1-6 yrs -0.156 0.132 -0.126 0.132 -0.231* 0.132 -0.120 0.135
age: 7-9 yrs -0.210 0.130 -0.190 0.131 -0.268** 0.130 -0.184 0.131
age: 10-15 yrs -0.095 0.118 -0.086 0.118 -0.127 0.119 -0.080 0.118
exports >5% of sales -0.029 0.152 -0.025 0.151 -0.041 0.150 -0.022 0.152
export status unknown or missing -0.533 0.869 -0.563 0.855 -0.596 0.899 -0.519 0.853
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.451 0.279 -0.460 0.280 -0.473* 0.276 -0.445 0.279
state owns more than 10% -0.011 0.530 0.014 0.527 0.011 0.522 0.002 0.534
ownership status unknown or missing 0.684 0.680 0.691 0.700 0.659 0.668 0.696 0.688
log of GRP for 2010 -0.203 0.229 0.117 0.267 -0.130 0.232 -0.196 0.231
% self-identifying as Russian 0.023*** 0.005 0.023*** 0.004 0.027*** 0.005 0.023*** 0.005
% construction in GRP value-added 0.113*** 0.019 0.097*** 0.019 0.115*** 0.018 0.117*** 0.021
% retail in GRP value-added 0.003 0.018 0.018 0.020 -0.005 0.019 0.007 0.018
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.014 0.012 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.012
sector: light manufacturing -0.203 0.152 -0.218 0.152 -0.212 0.150 -0.204 0.152
sector: heavy manufacturing 0.054 0.144 0.045 0.143 0.058 0.142 0.055 0.144
sector: machinery and electronics 0.190 0.182 0.177 0.183 0.204 0.181 0.180 0.182
sector: services -0.213 0.146 -0.213 0.145 -0.203 0.146 -0.214 0.146
sector: construction 0.368** 0.165 0.360** 0.163 0.372** 0.162 0.371** 0.165
population per sq. km -0.00007 0.00006 -0.00019 0.00008 -0.00008 0.00006 -0.00007 0.00006
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.207 0.126 -0.147 0.126 -0.383*** 0.128 -0.114 0.127
/cut1 -0.115 2.792 2.835 3.144 2.222 2.806 0.719 2.750
/cut2 0.450 2.788 3.404 3.142 2.793 2.802 1.283 2.748
/cut3 1.547 2.775 4.506 3.133 3.899 2.794 2.379 2.736
/cut4 3.396 2.760 6.355** 3.122 5.752** 2.780 4.229 2.720
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.036 0.038 0.040 0.035
161 180 206 157
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,305 3,305 3,305 3,305
Table A5.25. Ordered Logit Regressions, bribes to regional/local officials - direct impact (ECAq44c)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.265** 0.116 -0.990** 0.482 -0.460*** 0.122 -0.297** 0.125
Governor's tenure (log) -0.302*** 0.074 -0.442*** 0.127
Governor: origin X tenure 0.198 0.124
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.608*** 0.167
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.243 0.150
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile -0.241* 0.126
Governor's tenure (months) -0.011*** 0.003
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00004 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees -0.426*** 0.115 -0.422*** 0.114 -0.428*** 0.113 -0.432*** 0.114
size: 20-99 employees 0.011 0.110 0.015 0.110 -0.004 0.110 0.007 0.110
age: 1-6 yrs -0.167 0.104 -0.156 0.104 -0.020 0.103 -0.136 0.104
age: 7-9 yrs -0.056 0.114 -0.052 0.114 0.037 0.112 -0.036 0.113
age: 10-15 yrs -0.228** 0.103 -0.225** 0.103 -0.185* 0.104 -0.217** 0.103
exports >5% of sales 0.444*** 0.117 0.446*** 0.117 0.410*** 0.117 0.449*** 0.117
export status unknown or missing 0.219 0.428 0.214 0.426 0.241 0.425 0.230 0.427
foreign actors own more than 10% 0.058 0.206 0.045 0.206 0.043 0.212 0.057 0.205
state owns more than 10% -0.453 0.412 -0.448 0.411 -0.419 0.404 -0.437 0.411
ownership status unknown or missing 0.263 0.357 0.283 0.359 0.242 0.369 0.277 0.357
log of GRP for 2010 -0.197 0.276 -0.078 0.272 -0.402 0.262 -0.191 0.276
% self-identifying as Russian 0.011*** 0.003 0.011*** 0.003 0.016*** 0.004 0.011*** 0.003
% construction in GRP value-added 0.060*** 0.016 0.054*** 0.016 0.060*** 0.015 0.066*** 0.018
% retail in GRP value-added -0.020 0.013 -0.016 0.014 -0.029** 0.013 -0.017 0.013
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.009 0.010 0.006 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010
sector: light manufacturing 0.095 0.123 0.091 0.122 0.103 0.121 0.088 0.122
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.151 0.119 -0.154 0.119 -0.132 0.117 -0.149 0.119
sector: machinery and electronics -0.234* 0.139 -0.239* 0.139 -0.234* 0.138 -0.245* 0.139
sector: services 0.019 0.112 0.019 0.111 0.017 0.110 0.019 0.112
sector: construction -0.148 0.125 -0.150 0.125 -0.156 0.126 -0.145 0.126
population per sq. km 0.00003 0.00006 -0.00001 0.00006 0.00004 0.00005 0.00003 0.00006
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.019 0.124 0.007 0.124 0.255** 0.126 0.074 0.125
/cut1 -2.191 3.392 -1.157 3.338 -3.011 3.105 -1.211 3.309
/cut2 -1.446 3.398 -0.412 3.344 -2.259 3.110 -0.466 3.315
/cut3 -0.198 3.412 0.837 3.355 -1.001 3.120 0.781 3.328
/cut4 1.432 3.401 2.469 3.344 0.637 3.107 2.411 3.319
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.018 0.019 0.023 0.018
157 159 177 154
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4,151 4,151 4,151 4,151
Table A5.26. Ordered Logit Regressions, labor regulations - an obstacle (l30a)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.354*** 0.099 -0.120 0.432 -0.469*** 0.101 -0.334*** 0.101
Governor's tenure (log) -0.159*** 0.059 -0.115 0.103
Governor: origin X tenure -0.063 0.116
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.312** 0.139
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.324** 0.126
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile -0.013 0.117
Governor's tenure (months) -0.003 0.003
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00000 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees -0.581*** 0.098 -0.582*** 0.098 -0.592*** 0.098 -0.584*** 0.098
size: 20-99 employees -0.121 0.097 -0.123 0.097 -0.132 0.097 -0.121 0.097
age: 1-6 yrs -0.029 0.098 -0.032 0.099 0.103 0.098 -0.029 0.098
age: 7-9 yrs -0.045 0.096 -0.047 0.096 0.042 0.096 -0.043 0.095
age: 10-15 yrs -0.183** 0.090 -0.185** 0.090 -0.140 0.090 -0.183** 0.090
exports >5% of sales 0.106 0.103 0.105 0.103 0.091 0.103 0.106 0.103
export status unknown or missing -0.176 0.617 -0.175 0.619 -0.143 0.588 -0.188 0.619
foreign actors own more than 10% 0.243 0.171 0.247 0.171 0.237 0.175 0.250 0.171
state owns more than 10% -0.408 0.380 -0.413 0.378 -0.367 0.382 -0.414 0.380
ownership status unknown or missing 0.219 0.265 0.214 0.265 0.223 0.276 0.229 0.264
log of GRP for 2010 0.072 0.199 0.031 0.208 -0.107 0.194 0.089 0.201
% self-identifying as Russian -0.006* 0.003 -0.006** 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.006** 0.003
%construction in GRP value-added 0.020 0.014 0.022 0.014 0.018 0.013 0.018 0.014
%retail in GRP value-added -0.001 0.012 -0.002 0.012 -0.008 0.012 0.001 0.012
%natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.005 0.008 -0.004 0.008 -0.004 0.008 -0.005 0.008
sector: light manufacturing 0.241** 0.112 0.244** 0.112 0.238** 0.113 0.242** 0.112
sector: heavy manufacturing 0.085 0.104 0.087 0.104 0.088 0.105 0.083 0.104
sector: machinery and electronics 0.254** 0.121 0.256** 0.121 0.240** 0.120 0.249** 0.120
sector: services 0.315*** 0.094 0.314*** 0.094 0.309*** 0.096 0.311*** 0.094
sector: construction 0.112 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.092 0.112 0.109 0.112
population per sq. km -0.00004 0.00004 -0.00003 0.00005 -0.00003 0.00004 -0.00004 0.00004
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.185* 0.105 -0.195* 0.106 0.051 0.104 -0.181* 0.104
/cut1 -1.077 2.379 -1.444 2.427 -2.267 2.277 -0.456 2.342
/cut2 -0.490 2.379 -0.856 2.428 -1.677 2.277 0.130 2.343
/cut3 0.367 2.380 0.001 2.427 -0.816 2.278 0.987 2.344
/cut4 1.797 2.379 1.431 2.427 0.621 2.277 2.416 2.343
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.015 0.015 0.017 0.015
170 171 210 171
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4,131 4,131 4,131 4,131
Table A5.27. Ordered Logit Regressions, uneducated workforce - an obstacle (l30b)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.735*** 0.111 0.518 0.514 -0.786*** 0.101 -0.755*** 0.109
Governor's tenure (log) 0.158*** 0.061 0.389*** 0.107
Governor: origin X tenure -0.338** 0.143
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile -0.102 0.148
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.535*** 0.138
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.192 0.135
Governor's tenure (months) 0.004 0.003
Governor's tenure squared (months) -0.00001 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees -0.120 0.101 -0.119 0.100 -0.126 0.101 -0.116 0.100
size: 20-99 employees -0.113 0.099 -0.116 0.099 -0.110 0.099 -0.113 0.099
age: 1-6 yrs -0.314*** 0.097 -0.336*** 0.098 -0.271*** 0.097 -0.281*** 0.098
age: 7-9 yrs -0.255*** 0.093 -0.267*** 0.093 -0.227** 0.093 -0.235** 0.093
age: 10-15 yrs -0.021 0.086 -0.033 0.086 0.005 0.087 -0.011 0.086
exports >5% of sales 0.078 0.102 0.073 0.103 0.052 0.103 0.077 0.102
export status unknown or missing -0.429 0.529 -0.381 0.519 -0.349 0.543 -0.417 0.530
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.327 0.221 -0.311 0.218 -0.347 0.223 -0.325 0.222
state owns more than 10% 0.390 0.445 0.357 0.456 0.455 0.446 0.407 0.440
ownership status unknown or missing 0.417 0.356 0.389 0.355 0.411 0.352 0.420 0.353
log of GRP for 2010 0.715*** 0.259 0.453 0.305 0.485** 0.227 0.709*** 0.259
% self-identifying as Russian -0.010*** 0.004 -0.010*** 0.004 -0.005 0.004 -0.010** 0.004
% construction in GRP value-added -0.033** 0.014 -0.023 0.014 -0.029** 0.013 -0.034** 0.015
% retail in GRP value-added 0.001 0.016 -0.008 0.017 -0.009 0.015 0.000 0.016
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.019** 0.009 -0.014* 0.009 -0.015* 0.008 -0.019** 0.009
sector: light manufacturing -0.023 0.120 -0.008 0.119 -0.035 0.116 -0.019 0.119
sector: heavy manufacturing 0.099 0.120 0.108 0.119 0.100 0.117 0.103 0.120
sector: machinery and electronics -0.013 0.148 0.006 0.147 -0.008 0.144 -0.014 0.148
sector: services -0.037 0.109 -0.040 0.109 -0.051 0.105 -0.033 0.108
sector: construction -0.219 0.136 -0.221* 0.134 -0.259* 0.133 -0.217 0.136
population per sq. km -0.00009 0.00006 -0.00001 0.00008 -0.00007 0.00006 -0.00010 0.00006
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.247** 0.101 -0.297*** 0.101 -0.198* 0.107 -0.179* 0.107
/cut1 6.325* 3.300 3.809 3.783 3.108 2.861 5.938* 3.280
/cut2 7.552** 3.291 5.038 3.773 4.347 2.854 7.165** 3.271
/cut3 8.842*** 3.285 6.336* 3.762 5.653** 2.850 8.457*** 3.267
/cut4 10.380*** 3.284 7.881** 3.753 7.201** 2.849 9.996*** 3.266
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.021 0.022 0.026 0.021
132 140 176 141
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,646 3,646 3,646 3,646
Table A5.28. Ordered Logit Regressions, Perception of corruption - Town no. 1 (vin1a)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.456*** 0.098 -0.476 0.553 -0.468*** 0.093 -0.520*** 0.100
Governor's tenure (log) 0.067 0.062 0.063 0.130
Governor: origin X tenure 0.005 0.157
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile -0.009 0.148
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.196 0.144
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.228* 0.135
Governor's tenure (months) -0.003 0.003
Governor's tenure squared (months) 0.00002 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees -0.162 0.107 -0.162 0.107 -0.169 0.107 -0.163 0.107
size: 20-99 employees -0.047 0.111 -0.047 0.111 -0.045 0.110 -0.055 0.112
age: 1-6 yrs -0.081 0.103 -0.080 0.104 -0.062 0.103 -0.055 0.105
age: 7-9 yrs 0.135 0.096 0.135 0.096 0.151 0.096 0.144 0.097
age: 10-15 yrs 0.148 0.092 0.148 0.092 0.161* 0.091 0.157* 0.092
exports >5% of sales 0.145 0.117 0.145 0.117 0.139 0.117 0.144 0.116
export status unknown or missing 0.121 0.667 0.120 0.666 0.177 0.669 0.131 0.647
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.336* 0.201 -0.336* 0.201 -0.337* 0.199 -0.341* 0.200
state owns more than 10% 0.616 0.421 0.616 0.421 0.668 0.420 0.627 0.418
ownership status unknown or missing -0.276 0.423 -0.276 0.423 -0.262 0.408 -0.289 0.422
log of GRP for 2010 0.264 0.236 0.268 0.268 0.166 0.215 0.255 0.236
% self-identifying as Russian -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004
% construction in GRP value-added -0.016 0.013 -0.016 0.014 -0.014 0.013 -0.007 0.014
% retail in GRP value-added -0.021 0.015 -0.021 0.016 -0.025* 0.014 -0.021 0.014
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.012 0.008 -0.012 0.008 -0.009 0.008 -0.011 0.008
sector: light manufacturing -0.142 0.117 -0.142 0.116 -0.153 0.116 -0.139 0.118
sector: heavy manufacturing 0.028 0.124 0.028 0.123 0.026 0.122 0.038 0.124
sector: machinery and electronics -0.115 0.149 -0.116 0.149 -0.109 0.148 -0.118 0.149
sector: services -0.159 0.111 -0.159 0.111 -0.169 0.110 -0.143 0.111
sector: construction -0.171 0.136 -0.171 0.136 -0.194 0.137 -0.164 0.135
population per sq. km -0.00010 0.00006 -0.00010 0.00007 -0.00009 0.00005 -0.00011 0.00006
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.101 0.103 -0.100 0.103 -0.084 0.110 -0.025 0.109
/cut1 1.347 2.952 1.383 3.215 0.028 2.649 1.205 2.914
/cut2 2.272 2.956 2.308 3.220 0.955 2.653 2.132 2.919
/cut3 3.601 2.952 3.637 3.216 2.289 2.651 3.465 2.916
/cut4 5.340* 2.950 5.376* 3.218 4.035 2.650 5.205* 2.915
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.009 0.009 0.011 0.010
68 71 82 81
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,662 3,662 3,662 3,662
Table A5.29. Ordered Logit Regressions, Perception of corruption - Town no. 2 (vin1b)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.206** 0.093 1.284*** 0.375 -0.137 0.090 -0.185* 0.097
Governor's tenure (log) 0.285*** 0.065 0.559*** 0.088
Governor: origin X tenure -0.399*** 0.094
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile -0.707*** 0.155
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.424*** 0.149
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.088 0.114
Governor's tenure (months) 0.010*** 0.003
Governor's tenure squared (months) -0.00003 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees 0.050 0.111 0.045 0.111 0.048 0.111 0.058 0.111
size: 20-99 employees 0.143 0.109 0.132 0.109 0.144 0.109 0.149 0.109
age: 1-6 yrs -0.142 0.099 -0.162 0.099 -0.147 0.099 -0.152 0.099
age: 7-9 yrs -0.234** 0.101 -0.239** 0.100 -0.221** 0.101 -0.242** 0.100
age: 10-15 yrs -0.022 0.088 -0.029 0.087 -0.017 0.089 -0.029 0.088
exports >5% of sales 0.084 0.119 0.083 0.120 0.087 0.118 0.076 0.120
export status unknown or missing -0.410 0.726 -0.352 0.717 -0.329 0.739 -0.392 0.726
foreign actors own more than 10% 0.006 0.190 0.024 0.190 0.011 0.192 0.005 0.190
state owns more than 10% 0.390 0.385 0.353 0.383 0.410 0.383 0.382 0.382
ownership status unknown or missing 0.637* 0.340 0.600* 0.340 0.663* 0.339 0.622* 0.342
log of GRP for 2010 0.513** 0.210 0.223 0.216 0.486** 0.213 0.494** 0.211
% self-identifying as Russian -0.021*** 0.003 -0.021*** 0.003 -0.023*** 0.003 -0.021*** 0.003
% construction in GRP value-added -0.082*** 0.014 -0.071*** 0.013 -0.082*** 0.013 -0.087*** 0.015
% retail in GRP value-added -0.005 0.014 -0.016 0.015 -0.002 0.014 -0.009 0.014
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.019** 0.009 -0.014 0.009 -0.016* 0.009 -0.020** 0.009
sector: light manufacturing 0.012 0.114 0.033 0.113 -0.002 0.112 0.016 0.114
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.179* 0.109 -0.168 0.108 -0.195* 0.107 -0.180* 0.109
sector: machinery and electronics -0.021 0.139 -0.005 0.140 -0.035 0.138 -0.013 0.139
sector: services 0.046 0.102 0.046 0.102 0.031 0.102 0.044 0.103
sector: construction 0.015 0.135 0.016 0.133 -0.006 0.133 0.008 0.134
population per sq. km 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010 0.00005 0.00001 0.00005 0.00000 0.00005
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.066 0.110 -0.126 0.110 -0.061 0.112 -0.113 0.114
/cut1 1.660 2.444 -1.065 2.520 -0.124 2.508 0.620 2.465
/cut2 2.630 2.446 -0.096 2.524 0.846 2.508 1.588 2.467
/cut3 3.846 2.457 1.125 2.533 2.068 2.518 2.803 2.478
/cut4 5.333** 2.457 2.620 2.531 3.567 2.520 4.290* 2.477
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.020 0.022 0.022 0.019
164 189 188 162
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,664 3,664 3,664 3,664
Table A5.30. Ordered Logit Regressions, Perception of corruption - Town no. 3 (vin1c)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.188* 0.104 2.444*** 0.400 -0.076 0.104 -0.138 0.110
Governor's tenure (log) 0.236*** 0.057 0.715*** 0.083
Governor: origin X tenure -0.705*** 0.100
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile -0.668*** 0.135
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile 0.009 0.144
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.036 0.123
Governor's tenure (months) 0.009*** 0.003
Governor's tenure squared (months) -0.00003 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees 0.093 0.102 0.089 0.101 0.098 0.101 0.104 0.102
size: 20-99 employees -0.003 0.098 -0.020 0.098 0.000 0.098 0.007 0.098
age: 1-6 yrs -0.244** 0.095 -0.286*** 0.095 -0.319*** 0.097 -0.305*** 0.097
age: 7-9 yrs -0.309*** 0.095 -0.326*** 0.095 -0.347*** 0.097 -0.347*** 0.095
age: 10-15 yrs -0.144 0.088 -0.164* 0.087 -0.164* 0.088 -0.169* 0.088
exports >5% of sales 0.019 0.110 0.004 0.111 0.042 0.110 0.007 0.111
export status unknown or missing -0.180 0.546 -0.114 0.517 -0.200 0.541 -0.189 0.540
foreign actors own more than 10% 0.037 0.168 0.073 0.170 0.043 0.168 0.034 0.169
state owns more than 10% 0.333 0.478 0.326 0.477 0.352 0.478 0.307 0.469
ownership status unknown or missing -0.173 0.265 -0.238 0.269 -0.168 0.268 -0.196 0.268
log of GRP for 2010 -0.016 0.239 -0.554** 0.251 0.120 0.216 -0.034 0.237
% self-identifying as Russian -0.010*** 0.003 -0.011*** 0.003 -0.015*** 0.003 -0.010*** 0.003
% construction in GRP value-added 0.012 0.013 0.033** 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.007 0.014
% retail in GRP value-added 0.009 0.013 -0.008 0.014 0.019 0.013 0.005 0.013
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.011 0.008 0.022*** 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.011 0.008
sector: light manufacturing -0.149 0.110 -0.117 0.109 -0.157 0.108 -0.146 0.110
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.128 0.107 -0.109 0.105 -0.148 0.106 -0.132 0.107
sector: machinery and electronics -0.155 0.130 -0.135 0.128 -0.166 0.129 -0.138 0.129
sector: services -0.037 0.109 -0.045 0.107 -0.039 0.108 -0.046 0.108
sector: construction -0.220* 0.117 -0.220* 0.117 -0.215* 0.117 -0.225* 0.116
population per sq. km 0.00004 0.00004 0.00021 0.00005 0.00003 0.00004 0.00005 0.00004
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes 0.171* 0.100 0.061 0.100 0.060 0.107 0.011 0.106
/cut1 -2.513 2.815 -7.667*** 2.938 -2.296 2.544 -3.544 2.773
/cut2 -1.557 2.817 -6.710** 2.939 -1.337 2.546 -2.589 2.774
/cut3 -0.283 2.829 -5.424* 2.948 -0.054 2.556 -1.317 2.786
/cut4 1.291 2.836 -3.823 2.951 1.532 2.562 0.256 2.793
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.008 0.014 0.011 0.007
69 125 98 67
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,660 3,660 3,660 3,660
Table A5.31. Ordered Logit Regressions, Perception of corruption - Town no. 4 (vin1d)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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coef se coef se coef se coef se
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes 0.019 0.114 3.390*** 0.421 0.094 0.116 0.100 0.121
Governor's tenure (log) 0.234*** 0.065 0.869*** 0.098
Governor: origin X tenure -0.905*** 0.107
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile -0.872*** 0.161
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.210 0.154
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile -0.323** 0.130
Governor's tenure (months) 0.012*** 0.003
Governor's tenure squared (months) -0.00005 0.00001
size: less than 20 employees 0.150 0.105 0.142 0.106 0.159 0.104 0.161 0.104
size: 20-99 employees 0.029 0.104 0.006 0.105 0.029 0.104 0.041 0.104
age: 1-6 yrs -0.038 0.104 -0.089 0.104 -0.067 0.105 -0.091 0.105
age: 7-9 yrs -0.112 0.106 -0.137 0.106 -0.127 0.106 -0.145 0.105
age: 10-15 yrs -0.136 0.097 -0.162* 0.097 -0.147 0.098 -0.161* 0.097
exports >5% of sales 0.059 0.122 0.049 0.122 0.081 0.121 0.048 0.122
export status unknown or missing -0.492 0.702 -0.394 0.693 -0.492 0.699 -0.481 0.696
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.130 0.181 -0.090 0.182 -0.122 0.179 -0.128 0.182
state owns more than 10% -0.006 0.449 -0.079 0.472 -0.029 0.454 -0.043 0.446
ownership status unknown or missing 0.203 0.404 0.111 0.428 0.222 0.411 0.183 0.405
log of GRP for 2010 0.143 0.256 -0.471* 0.254 0.275 0.243 0.144 0.251
% self-identifying as Russian -0.015*** 0.003 -0.016*** 0.003 -0.021*** 0.003 -0.016*** 0.003
% construction in GRP value-added -0.010 0.017 0.012 0.016 -0.013 0.015 -0.021 0.018
% retail in GRP value-added 0.018 0.014 -0.005 0.015 0.025* 0.015 0.013 0.014
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.003 0.008 0.009 0.008 -0.005 0.008 -0.004 0.008
sector: light manufacturing -0.254** 0.118 -0.215* 0.118 -0.253** 0.116 -0.250** 0.118
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.230* 0.119 -0.209* 0.117 -0.244** 0.116 -0.239** 0.118
sector: machinery and electronics -0.218* 0.129 -0.193 0.129 -0.232* 0.128 -0.202 0.127
sector: services 0.009 0.119 0.002 0.117 0.015 0.119 -0.007 0.117
sector: construction -0.252* 0.130 -0.246** 0.124 -0.237* 0.128 -0.263** 0.127
population per sq. km 0.00007 0.00005 0.00027 0.00006 0.00006 0.00005 0.00007 0.00005
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes 0.158 0.107 0.025 0.106 0.152 0.110 0.006 0.111
/cut1 -1.226 3.103 -6.894** 3.007 -1.276 2.903 -2.057 3.027
/cut2 -0.495 3.105 -6.161** 3.007 -0.543 2.905 -1.327 3.029
/cut3 0.564 3.121 -5.085* 3.019 0.524 2.921 -0.268 3.045
/cut4 1.909 3.124 -3.708 3.024 1.882 2.926 1.082 3.050
Number of observations
chi2
chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R2
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.011 0.021 0.015 0.012
106 184 126 117
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3,609 3,609 3,609 3,609
Table A5.32. Ordered Logit Regressions, Perception of corruption - Town no. 5 (vin1e)
Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV
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Specification	I Specification	II Specification	III Specification	IV
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.0275** -0.0258* -0.0268** -0.0269**
(0.0116) (0.0134) (0.0119) (0.0122)
Governor's tenure (log) 0.00476 0.00409
(0.00742) (0.00758)
Governor: origin X tenure 0.00708
(0.0142)
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile -0.0180
(0.0189)
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.00787
(0.0161)
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile -0.00807
(0.0138)
Governor's tenure (months) 0.000236
(0.000317)
Governor's tenure squared (months) -7.64e-07
(1.29e-06)
size: less than 20 employees -0.00998 -0.00970 -0.00955 -0.0100
(0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131)
size: 20-99 employees -0.00348 -0.00335 -0.00342 -0.00348
(0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120)
age: 1-6 yrs -0.0335** -0.0326** -0.0329** -0.0328**
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0157) (0.0158)
age: 7-9 yrs -0.0290** -0.0284** -0.0286** -0.0283**
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0144)
age: 10-15 yrs -0.0220* -0.0219* -0.0216* -0.0217*
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0127)
exports >5% of sales 0.0128 0.0128 0.0130 0.0127
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0154)
foreign actors own more than 10% 0.0348* 0.0343* 0.0351* 0.0350*
(0.0194) (0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0194)
log of GRP for 2010 -0.0287 -0.0236 -0.0287 -0.0280
(0.0223) (0.0228) (0.0213) (0.0221)
% self-identifying as Russian -0.000200 -0.000182 -0.000283 -0.000234
(0.000377) (0.000364) (0.000398) (0.000378)
%construction in GRP value-added 0.00126 0.00104 0.00129 0.000983
(0.00160) (0.00156) (0.00164) (0.00167)
%retail in GRP value-added 0.00129 0.00150 0.00139 0.00126
(0.00156) (0.00163) (0.00160) (0.00155)
%natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.00138 0.00127 0.00137 0.00131
(0.000837) (0.000824) (0.000845) (0.000839)
sector: light manufacturing -0.00525 -0.00525 -0.00500 -0.00536
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0137)
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.00451 -0.00457 -0.00444 -0.00482
(0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0130)
sector: machinery and electronics -0.0611** -0.0612** -0.0613** -0.0615**
(0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0283)
sector: services -0.0216 -0.0215 -0.0214 -0.0216
(0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163)
sector: construction 0.00545 0.00557 0.00570 0.00512
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0151)
population per sq. km 3.37e-09 -1.78e-06 2.55e-07 -1.67e-07
(5.24e-06) (5.91e-06) (5.17e-06) (5.18e-06)
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.0129 -0.0113 -0.0116 -0.0120
(0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0150) (0.0155)
Observations 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
Table A6.1. Logit Regressions: was bribe expected at tax meetings (j5)
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Specification	I Specification	II Specification	III Specification	IV
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.0438 -0.0438 -0.0300 -0.0373
(0.0275) (0.0313) (0.0308) (0.0292)
Governor's tenure (log) 0.0208 0.0201
(0.0163) (0.0162)
Governor: origin X tenure 0.00528
(0.0276)
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile -0.0734*
(0.0410)
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.0197
(0.0325)
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile -0.000225
(0.0279)
Governor's tenure (months) 0.000893
(0.000670)
Governor's tenure squared (months) -3.47e-06
(2.89e-06)
size: less than 20 employees -0.00556 -0.00494 -0.00503 -0.00556
(0.0302) (0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0302)
size: 20-99 employees 0.00532 0.00582 0.00571 0.00545
(0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0261) (0.0262)
age: 1-6 yrs -0.0274 -0.0271 -0.0284 -0.0331
(0.0294) (0.0293) (0.0290) (0.0297)
age: 7-9 yrs 0.0149 0.0155 0.0141 0.0101
(0.0312) (0.0313) (0.0301) (0.0306)
age: 10-15 yrs -0.00755 -0.00751 -0.00440 -0.00981
(0.0249) (0.0250) (0.0249) (0.0249)
exports >5% of sales 0.0797*** 0.0798*** 0.0822*** 0.0783***
(0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0257) (0.0258)
export status unknown or missing 0.106 0.105 0.112 0.0982
(0.0907) (0.0917) (0.0913) (0.0922)
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.0691 -0.0697 -0.0693 -0.0679
(0.0840) (0.0841) (0.0833) (0.0840)
state owns more than 10% 0.0505 0.0521 0.0525 0.0485
(0.0599) (0.0600) (0.0603) (0.0600)
log of GRP for 2010 0.0656 0.0735 0.0811 0.0670
(0.0527) (0.0555) (0.0558) (0.0530)
% self-identifying as Russian -0.000535 -0.000532 -0.00111 -0.000611
(0.000815) (0.000800) (0.000967) (0.000848)
% construction in GRP value-added -0.00199 -0.00215 -0.00256 -0.00273
(0.00398) (0.00395) (0.00401) (0.00415)
% retail in GRP value-added -0.00254 -0.00227 -0.00182 -0.00285
(0.00297) (0.00295) (0.00315) (0.00296)
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.00104 -0.00112 -0.00120 -0.00125
(0.00173) (0.00174) (0.00181) (0.00182)
sector: light manufacturing -0.000366 -0.000406 -0.00317 -0.000866
(0.0345) (0.0344) (0.0341) (0.0343)
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.00909 -0.00919 -0.00884 -0.00958
(0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0297) (0.0297)
sector: machinery and electronics -0.0484 -0.0482 -0.0506* -0.0484
(0.0305) (0.0304) (0.0301) (0.0306)
sector: services -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.105*** -0.106***
(0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0366) (0.0364)
sector: construction -0.0284 -0.0283 -0.0283 -0.0302
(0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0252) (0.0253)
population per sq. km -2.61e-06 -5.19e-06 -3.59e-06 -2.90e-06
(1.08e-05) (1.13e-05) (1.12e-05) (1.07e-05)
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes 0.0297 0.0329 0.0287 0.0164
(0.0352) (0.0369) (0.0322) (0.0341)
Observations 893 893 893 893
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
Table A6.2. Logit Regressions: was bribe expected to get operating license (j15)
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Specification	I Specification	II Specification	III Specification	IV
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.0655 -0.0359 -0.0545 -0.0364
(0.0603) (0.0703) (0.0569) (0.0591)
Governor's tenure (log) 0.0215 0.0171
(0.0335) (0.0336)
Governor: origin X tenure 0.0741
(0.0639)
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.0470
(0.0861)
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile 0.0358
(0.0789)
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile 0.244***
(0.0607)
Governor's tenure (months) 0.00309**
(0.00157)
Governor's tenure squared (months) -1.52e-05**
(7.16e-06)
size: less than 20 employees 0.0162 0.0182 -0.00401 0.00771
(0.0656) (0.0644) (0.0653) (0.0658)
size: 20-99 employees 0.0626 0.0648 0.0659 0.0609
(0.0545) (0.0536) (0.0532) (0.0543)
age: 1-6 yrs -0.0618 -0.0631 -0.0840 -0.0769
(0.0687) (0.0688) (0.0662) (0.0689)
age: 7-9 yrs -0.0261 -0.0260 -0.0297 -0.0344
(0.0704) (0.0707) (0.0673) (0.0682)
age: 10-15 yrs -0.0342 -0.0325 -0.0474 -0.0427
(0.0564) (0.0568) (0.0546) (0.0548)
exports >5% of sales 0.259*** 0.261*** 0.212*** 0.256***
(0.0643) (0.0638) (0.0615) (0.0637)
foreign actors own more than 10% -0.121 -0.116 -0.145 -0.129
(0.155) (0.158) (0.130) (0.147)
log of GRP for 2010 0.294*** 0.346*** 0.383*** 0.290***
(0.112) (0.120) (0.118) (0.111)
% self-identifying as Russian -0.00251 -0.00257 -0.00304 -0.00329*
(0.00177) (0.00173) (0.00194) (0.00183)
%construction in GRP value-added -0.0169* -0.0187** -0.0177** -0.0197**
(0.00939) (0.00930) (0.00752) (0.00894)
%retail in GRP value-added -0.00982 -0.00735 -0.00760 -0.00923
(0.00668) (0.00727) (0.00681) (0.00657)
%natural resource extraction in GRP value-added -0.0118*** -0.0124*** -0.0129*** -0.0118**
(0.00444) (0.00445) (0.00464) (0.00458)
sector: light manufacturing 0.00977 0.00252 0.00533 0.000142
(0.0719) (0.0726) (0.0679) (0.0702)
sector: heavy manufacturing -0.152** -0.158** -0.124* -0.159**
(0.0718) (0.0719) (0.0662) (0.0718)
sector: machinery and electronics -0.121 -0.128 -0.0961 -0.115
(0.0953) (0.0949) (0.0886) (0.0956)
sector: services -0.0408 -0.0453 -0.0475 -0.0388
(0.0730) (0.0738) (0.0673) (0.0704)
sector: construction -0.0189 -0.0245 -0.00534 -0.0128
(0.0570) (0.0572) (0.0539) (0.0566)
population per sq. km -9.01e-05*** -0.000102*** -0.000129** -9.65e-05**
(3.48e-05) (3.36e-05) (5.75e-05) (4.37e-05)
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes -0.0839 -0.0826 -0.128* -0.124*
(0.0681) (0.0680) (0.0674) (0.0671)
Observations 385 385 385 385
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
Table A6.3. Logit Regressions: was bribe expected for construction permit (g4)
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Specification	I Specification	II Specification	III Specification	IV
Insider Governor: 1 = Yes -0.0198* -0.0174 -0.0237** -0.0236**
(0.0111) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0119)
Governor's tenure (log) -0.0130** -0.0140**
(0.00653) (0.00662)
Governor: origin X tenure 0.0138
(0.0123)
Governor's tenure: 1st quartile 0.00627
(0.0162)
Governor's tenure: 2nd quartile -0.000879
(0.0153)
Governor's tenure: 3rd quartile -0.0215
(0.0141)
Governor's tenure (months) -0.000668**
(0.000276)
Governor's tenure squared (months) 2.62e-06**
(1.18e-06)
size: less than 20 employees -0.00114 -0.00102 -0.000440 -0.00137
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0138)
size: 20-99 employees 0.0154 0.0157 0.0155 0.0152
(0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140)
age: 1-6 yrs -0.00223 -0.00150 0.00291 -0.000403
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0129)
age: 7-9 yrs -0.00681 -0.00639 -0.00331 -0.00575
(0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143)
age: 10-15 yrs 0.000852 0.00121 0.00247 0.00162
(0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121)
exports >5% of sales 0.0223 0.0224 0.0223 0.0227
(0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140)
foreign actors own more than 10% 0.00414 0.00350 0.00357 0.00366
(0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0244)
ownership status unknown or missing -0.0165 -0.0158 -0.0172 -0.0167
(0.0495) (0.0496) (0.0495) (0.0497)
log of GRP for 2010 -0.0126 -0.00567 -0.0103 -0.0131
(0.0244) (0.0256) (0.0228) (0.0245)
% self-identifying as Russian 0.000350 0.000364 0.000268 0.000406
(0.000371) (0.000363) (0.000369) (0.000377)
% construction in GRP value-added 0.00186 0.00154 0.00144 0.00249
(0.00169) (0.00170) (0.00163) (0.00175)
% retail in GRP value-added -0.00318* -0.00299* -0.00306* -0.00305*
(0.00166) (0.00167) (0.00156) (0.00163)
% natural resource extraction in GRP value-added 0.000219 7.75e-05 5.39e-06 0.000284
(0.000955) (0.000955) (0.000899) (0.000941)
sector: light manufacturing -0.00574 -0.00614 -0.00511 -0.00581
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0143)
sector: heavy manufacturing 0.00797 0.00763 0.00861 0.00849
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125)
sector: machinery and electronics 0.0360** 0.0358** 0.0356** 0.0360**
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0159)
sector: services -0.0290** -0.0290** -0.0287** -0.0288**
(0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0144)
sector: construction 0.0290** 0.0288** 0.0298** 0.0295**
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0144)
population per sq. km 6.11e-06 4.03e-06 5.68e-06 6.24e-06
(6.19e-06) (6.50e-06) (5.68e-06) (6.22e-06)
Experience of Governor Change: 1 = Yes 0.000252 0.00196 0.0126 0.00609
(0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0134) (0.0130)
Observations 4,135 4,135 4,135 4,135
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
Table A6.4. Logit Regressions: Largest Obstacle - Access to land (m1adum4)
